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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 12, 2006, the Lebanese militia group Hezbollah staged an 
unprovoked attack across the Lebanon-Israel border in which two Israeli 
soldiers were taken hostage and three soldiers were killed.1  While such 
raids have generally provoked limited retaliation from Israel, these raids, 
large-scale rocket and mortar strikes on Northern Israeli military targets, 
and the simultaneous abduction of Israeli soldiers triggered a large 
response.2  Israel responded with a full-scale military attack on Lebanon 
that claimed over one thousand lives.3  While most of the international 
community expressed support for Israel’s right to defend itself against a 
terrorist attack, humanitarians condemned Israel’s response as both 
disproportionate and indiscriminate with respect to civilian life.4  Critics 
 1. Mohamad Bazzi, Remorse over Abductions: Leader Says That Hezbollah 
Would Not Have Kidnapped Troops If They Had Known It Would Lead to War, 
NEWSDAY, Aug. 28, 2006, at A23.  Arab nations have been unsuccessful in waging 
conventional wars against Israel.  Fred Gedrich & Paul E. Vallely, Despicable Breeders: 
Hezbollah an Immoral War Machine, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at A17.  Arab 
extremists, such as Hezbollah, have increasingly relied on terrorism to advance their 
ultimate goal of destroying the Jewish state of Israel, which they view as an illegal, 
Western imposition on their land.  Id. 
 2. Thomas L. Friedman, The Arab Commission, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A5.  
The abduction of another Israeli soldier in Gaza a few weeks before Hezbollah’s July 12 
attack had been met with little retaliation.  However, Hezbollah’s July attack came on the 
heels of the induction of Israel’s new prime minister, new defense minister, and new 
Army Chief of Staff; these new office heads felt tested into showing a stronger response 
to the attacks.  Id. 
 3. Bazzi, supra note 1, at A23.  An Israeli Army spokesman explained the reason 
for the response stating that “[s]trategically speaking, if the third largest city in Israel is 
under attack, it’s a big thing and a response can be expected.”  Uri Dan, Rockets Go 
Deep into Israel as Leb Reels Under Blitz, N.Y. POST, July 14, 2006, at 4.  Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad warned Israel against retaliating because it would be 
considered an assault on the whole Islamic world that would bring a “fierce response.”  
Id.  The European Union and Russia warned Israel against dangerous escalation.  
Surprisingly, moderate Arab governments, who are rarely friendly with Israel, showed 
restraint in criticizing the Jewish state.  This is most likely a reflection of popular opinion 
in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, that Hezbollah was to blame.  The strongest reaction 
to the conflict may have come from the world financial markets; oil prices soared by 
$1.75 to $76.70 a barrel and gold rose by more than $3 an ounce.  Id. 
 4. Kevin Sullivan, Rights Group Accuses Hezbollah of “Indiscriminate” Killing, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at A15. 
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claim that Hezbollah’s aggravations did not justify a full-scale raid on 
Lebanon, in which civilian infrastructure was targeted and collateral 
damage was high.5  Despite criticism from human rights groups, Israel 
has maintained that the decisive use of force was necessary.6  Israel 
claims that Hezbollah is not merely an isolated militia group, but is 
instead a well-connected terrorist cell acting for Middle East extremists 
Iran and Syria.7  Thus, Israel believed it was justified in using significant 
force to fight against terror.8 
The Israel-Lebanon conflict has highlighted difficult questions surrounding 
military responses to terrorist attacks.9  While Israel’s response was 
forceful, this Comment argues that it was legitimate under international 
law.  There are inevitable problems that arise when a nation faces a 
terrorist militia that hides among civilians and generally operates outside 
 5. David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Israel Is Within Its Rights; What 
‘Disproportionate Force’?  A Nation is Allowed to Defend Itself from a Mortal Enemy, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 30, 2006, at H-4. 
 6. Amnesty International issued a report accusing Israel of using disproportionate 
bombing and indiscriminate munitions like cluster bombs to destroy Lebanon’s civilian 
infrastructure, and even went so far as to imply that individual commanders could be 
charged with war crimes.  AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL/LEBANON: DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION 
OR “COLLATERAL DAMAGE”?  ISRAELI ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 5–6 
(2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE180072006ENGLISH/$File 
/MDE1800706.pdf. 
 7. Dion Nissenbaum, Israel’s Military Action: A Reasonable Response?, MIAMI 
HERALD, Aug. 3, 2006, at A12.  Its militia disguise themselves as civilians, and they 
store weapons and launch attacks from civilian infrastructure such as mosques, schools, 
and hospitals in violation of the Geneva Conventions.  Gedrich & Vallely, supra note 1, 
at A17.  Their uses of suicide bombers in civilian markets, restaurants, and buses are 
clear violations of international norms.  Id.  The United Nations has called for Hezbollah, 
in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, to dismantle and disarm.  However, 
Hezbollah has resisted and refuses to conform to international laws of war.  Id. 
 8. Sullivan, supra note 4. 
 9. Terrorism is an inherent combination of violence and theater.  Dipak K. Gupta, 
The Cost of Fighting Terrorism, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 26, 2006, at B7.  The 
goal is to perpetuate death and destruction regardless of the scale in order to goad the 
community and the targeted government into reacting.  Id.  Nations have generally 
responded to these threats with force.  The assassination of the Austrian Archduke by a 
Serbian terrorist threw the world into the First World War.  Similarly, the attacks of Sept. 
11, 2001, created a global response: the war on terror.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
Israel responded after numerous provocations to the cross-border kidnapping of its 
soldiers by Hezbollah.  Id.; see also Editorial, Lebanon Crisis Has Echoes of 1914, 
SCOTSMAN, July 29, 2006, at 23 (arguing that the conflict could soon engulf many 
countries if Syria and Iran were to rearm Hezbollah, forcing the United States to provide 
support to Israel, and perhaps even directly attack Iran and Syria). 




the confines of international law.10  The wisdom of maintaining rigid 
laws of war given changing battlefield norms is a topic that is outside the 
scope of this Comment.11  Instead, this Comment will closely analyze 
Israel’s controversial actions both under the international customary 
rules of war and the sometimes aspirational Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions.  If found to have been in violation of international law, the 
individuals carrying out the attacks on behalf of Israel could be held 
criminally12 or civilly13 liable under customary international law.14 
 10. For better or worse, in following the rules of war, Israel was held to a 
stalemate.  Noel Dorr, Challenges Facing U.N. in Lebanon, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, 
at 14.  Hezbollah was not anticipating such a forceful response from Israel, and despite 
showing initial regret at the escalation of hostilities, the terrorist group has instead been 
bolstered by this conflict.  Id.  Though unable to secure any major offensive gains, their 
large cache of missiles and questionable battle techniques proved to be sufficient in 
defending against Israeli attacks.  Also surprising, to Israel especially, was that the 
Lebanese people have blamed Israel and not Hezbollah for the devastation of their 
country.  Thus, Hezbollah has gained in popularity and power, and it has yet to be seen 
whether they will accept the shaky government authority in their Southern strongholds.  
While U.N. forces are assisting a fragile Lebanese army, the ceasefire is not expected to 
last.  Id. 
 11. If nations cannot defend themselves against terrorist organizations and 
terrorists continue targeting civilian populations, then the laws of war have not served 
their purpose of protecting both combatants and noncombatants.  See Jackson Nyamuya 
Maogoto, Walking an International Law Tightrope: Use of Military Force to Counter 
Terrorism–Willing the Ends, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 405 (2006).  See generally 
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era: The “War on Terror,” 
4 SCHOLAR 209, 231–35 (2002) (considering how anticipatory self-defense might work 
within the framework of the rule of international law).  The battles between Israel and 
Arab extremist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are likely to continue.  Assuming that 
it can be shown that conducting controlled aerial campaigns against mixed populations 
are legitimate, Israel will likely increase the number of these campaigns.  However, 
while aerial campaigns may be legitimate, it has yet to be shown whether they will ever 
prove successful against terrorist militias.  New laws of war may be necessary when 
nations are forced to defend themselves against terrorist groups. 
 12. See Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader 
Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 165 (1972).  International law has recognized the 
doctrine of complicity since the Nuremberg Tribunals.  Id.  Thus, individual commanders or 
soldiers may be held criminally liable for aiding an abetting the primary perpetrator in 
the commission of an international crime.  Id.  The Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda has expressly defined complicity in genocide: 
[A]n accused is an accomplice to genocide if he or she knowingly and wilfully 
aided or abetted or instigated another to commit a crime of genocide, while 
being aware of his genocidal plan, even where the accused had no specific 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such. 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 726 (Sept. 2, 1998), 
available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm; see 
also JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 42 (2d ed. 2000). 
 13. Article 91 of the Protocol, which is almost an exact duplication of Article 3 of 
the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, states: “A Party to the conflict which violates the 
provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to 
pay compensation.  It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part 
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Part II of this Comment explores the background and history of the 
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.  Part III examines the history and 
development of the rules of war from early Christian theories of just war 
to the modern codification of the rules of war.  Part IV focuses on the 
doctrine of proportionality, particularly the different methods commonly 
employed to determine whether a response is proportionate.  Part IV also 
suggests an appropriate definition of proportionality in the context of 
combating international terrorism.  Part V considers the doctrine of 
military necessity with particular analysis of identifying military targets 
and interpreting “definite military advantage.”  Finally, Part VI addresses 
the doctrines of humanity and distinction with regard to the method of 
attack used in strikes and the weapons used to distinguish between 
military and civilian populations. 
II.  ISRAEL AND LEBANON ARMED CONFLICT 
Hezbollah is both an armed terrorist group and political party.15  The 
group, whose name means “party of God,” was established as a 
resistance group to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.16  The group 
of its armed forces.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].  While the Article 
outlines responsibilities for both the victor and the defeated party, it fails to include any 
details regarding possible compensation.  MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & 
WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 547 (1982). 
 14. Though Israel has not been a signatory to the Protocol, it still could be 
prosecuted to the extent the treaty embodies normative customary international law.  See 
Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary International Law During Armed Conflict, 
12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 601, 601–02 (1972).  Before World War II, Germany was a 
nonsignatory to the Hague Conventions, however German nationals were nonetheless 
prosecuted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for violations of 
customary laws reflected in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV.  Id. 
 15. Hezbollah has several thousand members and operates primarily in southern 
Lebanon, parts of Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley.  Hezbollah: The “Party of God,” USA 
TODAY, July 17, 2006, at 2A.  The group has claimed responsibility for hundreds of 
terrorist attacks including the 1983 suicide bombing that killed more than 200 U.S. 
Marines in their Beirut barracks, the kidnappings of Americans in Lebanon in the 1980s, 
and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847.  Id. 
 16. Following an attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador in London, 
Israel invaded an unstable Lebanon, which had been rife with civil war.  See 
PalestineFacts.org, Why Did Israel Invade Lebanon in 1982?, http://www.palestinefacts.org 
/pf_1967to1991_lebanon_198x_backgd.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).  Israel initially 
sought to install a buffer between Lebanon and the northern border of Israel.  Id.  
However, the fighting escalated into a full-scale war with the Palestinian Liberation 




has rejected Israel’s right to exist, repeatedly calling for total destruction 
of the Jewish people.17  Hezbollah has fought to win popularity among 
the Lebanese people by funding schools, hospitals, and providing other 
civilian aid.18  Following democratic elections that installed a shaky 
Lebanese government in 2005, Hezbollah won 14 seats in the 128-
member parliament.19  The group receives an estimated $300 million in 
weapons and monetary aid from Syria and Iran each year.20  The United 
Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1559 called for the disarmament 
of nonstate militias,21 which would make Hezbollah’s military activities 
illegal.  Hezbollah continued, however, to gain in strength and arms,22 
indicating that there was little effective U.N. enforcement of the 
resolution. 
Organization (PLO) and a smaller scale war with Syria.  Following a cease-fire, the PLO 
was forced out of Lebanon.  Id. 
 17. Anti-Defamation League, Amnesty International Report: Ignoring Hezbollah’s 
Reign of Terror (Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.adl.org/main_Israel/amnesty_international_ 
report.htm.  The current leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, has repeatedly 
called for the destruction of Israel.  In 1992, the group issued a statement declaring an 
“open war until the elimination of Israel and until the death of the last Jew on earth.”  Id. 
 18. In addition, the group has funded orphanages, agricultural services, and an 
extensive social welfare network in order to support Lebanese Shiites, who make up one-
third of Lebanon’s population and are among the poorest Lebanese.  Hezbollah: The 
“Party of God,” supra note 15, at 2A. 
 19. Maggie Farley, U.N. to Establish Lebanon Tribunal, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 
2007, at A1. 
 20. Hezbollah maintains strong relationships primarily with Iran’s clerical 
establishment and considers Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as 
the group’s spiritual reference, or marja.  Scott Peterson, In Mideast, Cease-Fire Is a 
Start, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 2006, at 1.  The group strongly supports the 
idea of velayat e-faqih (rule by a supreme jurisprudent), as seen in Iran’s Islamic regime.  
Further, the current leader of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, is Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s personal representative to Lebanon.  Id.  Iran has supplied Hezbollah with 
an estimated 12,000 rockets.  Sheldon Kirshner, Israel Battles Islamic Radicalism on 
Two Fronts, CAN. JEWISH NEWS, Aug. 3, 2006, at 13.  Iranian shipments of 
Katyusha-122 and Fajr-3 rockets are flown directly to Damascus and distributed to 
Hezbollah.  Syria has also given Hezbollah long-range rockets.  Id. 
 21. Lebanese Former President, Defence Minister Discuss Pro-Syria Rally, BBC 
MONITORING MIDDLE EAST, Nov. 30, 2004. 
 22. The size and strength of Hezbollah’s militia has been closely guarded.  
Jonathan Finer & Edward Cody, Hezbollah Unleashes Fiery Barrage: 230 Rockets Strike 
Northern Israel, Shattering Brief Lull, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2006, at A1.  A senior U.N. 
peacekeeping adviser in southern Lebanon has estimated the militia’s force at 700 
trained fighters and between 8000 to 20,000 farmers who are secretly trained and willing 
to fight if needed.  Israeli officials have estimated the force at 3000 fighters.  The size of 
Hezbollah’s arsenal can only be estimated because it has been building up its forces in 
secret for more than a year.  Israeli officials have estimated Hezbollah’s total number of 
rockets at 10,000.  If this number is accurate, less than one-third of the group’s rockets 
were destroyed or fired during the conflict.  Id. 
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Israel is comprised of 6.4 million residents on land roughly the size of 
New Jersey that is flanked on three sides by hostile Arab neighbors.23  
Israel has most often come under attack from extremist terrorist groups 
in both Lebanon and Gaza.24  In 2000, Israel unilaterally withdrew from 
southern Lebanon and the U.N. outlawed the Hezbollah militia.25  The 
Lebanese military has been unwilling or unable to control the Hezbollah 
terrorists, however, and Israel has weathered repeated militia rocket fire 
along the U.N. recognized border.  For years, Israel refrained from 
responding forcefully to the Hezbollah aggressions.26  Hezbollah’s bold 
decision to fire missiles deep into Israeli territory, penetrating further 
than any previous Arab attack and striking the third largest city, 
provoked Israel into a large-scale military reprisal.27 
As a member state of the U.N., Israel has a right to self-defense as 
provided in the U.N. charter.28  However, Israeli officials immediately 
faced calls from the international community to limit their response to 
only Hezbollah itself and not to the state that harbored it.29  Lebanon’s 
central government was weak, and the government was either unable or 
 
 23. Gedrich & Vallely, supra note 1, at A17.  Israel is significantly smaller in 
comparison to the Arab world, which is composed of twenty-one Arab countries and the 
Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank.  The Arab region spans 5.2 million 
square miles and has 333 million residents.  Further, the U.S. State Department estimates 
that there are nineteen formal terror organizations in existence in the Arab region.  Id. 
 24. Hamas and other Palestinian groups based in Gaza have fired more than 1000 
rockets into Israeli territory and have frequently attempted terrorist raids across the 
border.  Michael Oren, Necessary Steps for Israel: Confronting State Sponsors of Terror 
is the Only Option, WASH. POST, July 14, 2006, at A21. 
 25. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, retreating behind the defined southern 
border of Lebanon, which has been deemed the “blue line.”  Charles Krauthammer, Why 
They Fight, WASH. POST, July 14, 2006, at A21.  The U.N. Security Council declared 
that Israel had fully complied with the resolutions demanding its withdrawal from 
Lebanon.  Id. 
 26. Friedman, supra note 2. 
 27. Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, declared “Israel will not be held hostage 
by terror groups, a terror authority or by any sovereign country.”  Laura King & Megan 
K. Stack, Cease-Fire Efforts Stepped Up, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at A1. 
 28. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 29. President George W. Bush remarked that “Israel has the right to defend 
herself,” but he also called for care in attacking the unstable government in Lebanon, 
noting there is “ a group of terrorists who want to stop the advance of peace.”  Hassan M. 
Fattah & Steven Erlanger, Israel Blockades Lebanon; Wide Strikes by Hezbollah, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 14, 2006, at A1. 




unwilling to disarm militias operating along the Lebanon-Israel border.30  
Given that Hezbollah operated outside of international law and deliberately 
hid amongst civilian populations, Israel faced serious difficulties if it 
was to keep the campaign limited to the paramilitary terrorist group 
without affecting the unstable Lebanese government.31 
Despite the inherent difficulties, Israel responded to Hezbollah with 
speed and force.32  Israel conducted widespread air strikes on Lebanon, 
damaging civilian infrastructure that could be useful to Hezbollah, and 
invaded southern Lebanon by ground.33  Hezbollah killed 156 Israelis, 
primarily military members, through missile and rocket attacks.34  Israel’s 
air strikes are believed to have killed as many as 1200 Lebanese people, 
primarily civilians, and displaced 900,000 Lebanese civilians before the 
U.N.-brokered ceasefire ended the conflict on August 14, 2006.35  
According to the U.N., there are more than one million unexploded 
bomblets stuck in high trees and in the rubble, which pose serious 
danger to the 650,000 Lebanese civilians living in the region.36  The 
U.N. Resolution approved by both the Lebanese and Israeli governments 
calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops, the disarmament of Hezbollah, 
 30. Leon Hadar, All Is Not Well in the Middle East; The Bush Administration is 
Hoping That Israeli Military Power Will Succeed in Defeating Hezbollah and Hamas, 
BUS. TIMES SING., July 20, 2006. 
 31. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni summarized the difficulty, stating, “The 
result is it was more difficult to find these terrorists among civilians, compared to 
attacking a weak Lebanon. . . .  We could have done Lebanon in a few days, I think, if 
we had decided to attack Lebanon as a state.”  Glenn Kessler, Lebanon Must Disarm 
Hezbollah, Israeli Minister Warns, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2006, at A16. 
 32. Israel immediately called for its soldiers to be returned and that militias cease 
rocket fire from Gaza in the south and Lebanon in the north.  Greg Myre & Steven 
Erlanger, Clashes Spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah Raids Israel, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 
2006, at A1.  Hamas and Hezbollah responded by reiterating a desire for an exchange of 
Palestinian and other Arab prisoners held by Israel.  The leader of Hezbollah, Sheik 
Hassan Nasrallah, stated that “[t]he prisoners will not be returned except through one 
way—indirect negotiations and a trade.”  Id.  In 2004, Hezbollah pressured Israel into 
freeing more than 400 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners in exchange for an Israeli 
businessman and the bodies of three Israeli soldiers.  Israel is believed to have 9000 
Palestinian prisoners, and a minimal number of Lebanese prisoners in captivity.  Id. 
 33. Robin Wright, As Mideast Smoke Clears, Political Fates May Shift, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 13, 2006, at A10.  In the process, Lebanon’s infrastructure, which was 
previously rebuilt once after a vicious fifteen-year civil war, was severely damaged, and 
will require billions of dollars to reconstruct various power plants, roads, bridges, and 
housing units.  Id. 
 34. Jenny Booth & Stephen Farrell, Ceasefire Holds as Lebanon Awaits 
Peacekeepers, TIMES ONLINE (London), Aug. 14, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol 
/news/world/middle_east/article608776.ece. 
 35. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 2. 
 36. Michael Slackman, Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2006, at A1. Cluster munitions are composed of several small bomblets designed to 
detonate over a large area.  See infra Part VI.A.1 for additional discussion on the use of 
cluster bombs. 
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and the deployment of Lebanese and U.N. Interim Forces in southern 
Lebanon.37  While Israel has withdrawn, it is unlikely that Hezbollah 
will be disarmed. 
III.  HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES OF WAR 
Wars have plagued nations since the dawn of civilization.  Over the 
centuries, rules of war have developed in response to this reality.  The 
four main principles of war outlined in Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions—proportionality, necessity, distinction, and humanity38— 
stem from early thirteenth century Christian philosophy.39  It is 
important to understand the relevant law and doctrines as established 
through custom and treaties in order to accurately apply these principles 
to the Israel-Lebanon conflict.  As such, this Part will first explore the 
Christian theory of war and the codification of that theory. 
A.  Christian Theory of War 
The laws of war have been largely formed by Christian theology, and 
more particularly, the just war doctrine.40  While the Catholic Church 
was initially pacifist, Church leaders found justification for war from the 
Bible.41  Initial limitations on both the reasons for war and the methods 
of war gave rise to the four basic principles of combat seen in international 
law today: military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanity.42 
While nations have resorted to using military force to resolve conflicts 
 37. Toby Harnden, UN Fit for Purpose Kofi Annan Castigated Security Council 
Diplomats for Taking So Long to Reach a Resolution on Lebanon, but the United Nations 
Itself Is Not Above Criticism, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 13, 2006, at 19. 
 38. Protocol I to the Geneva Convention expanded the initial aim of the 
convention, which was to protect civilians and wounded prisoners, to include basic 
principles of how warfare should be conducted.  W. Hays Parks, The 1977 Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 31 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 17, 19 (1978). 
 39. See discussion infra at Part III.A. 
 40. See John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War Tradition, 16 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 221, 223 (2004). 
 41. The Church found justification for war in Scripture.  In Exodus, Moses parted 
the Red Sea, drowning the Egyptian soldiers who were trying to enslave the Israelites.  
Exodus 14:21 (King James).  In thanks, the Israelites sang, “The Lord is a man of war: 
the Lord is his name.”  Id. 15:3; see also Alexander C. Linn, The Just War Doctrine and 
State Liability for Paramilitary War Crimes, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 619, 621 
(2006). 
 42. Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use 
of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 179, 198 (2006). 




throughout history, there is evidence that soldiers have historically exercised 
restraint and used rules of engagement at some level in warfare.43  
Simply, some acts have always been considered dishonorable, while 
others are believed to be honorable and virtuous.44  These Christian 
morals concerning warfare norms, which developed between the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance, largely shaped western combat tactics.45 
The early Christian theory of the just war, justum bellum, invoked 
initially by St. Augustine, was concerned with the reasons and purpose 
for declaring war, the jus ad bellum.46  Just war theorists determined that 
a just war required three components: (1) that the war is declared by a 
sovereign ruler, since only a ruler has the authority to protect the welfare 
of his citizens; (2) that the cause of war is just, particularly that the ruler 
strives to restore something lost, defend against an attack, or avenge a 
wrong; and (3) that the attackers must intend to promote good and shun 
evil.47  While the conditions under which a war could be declared were 
restricted, there were no limitations on the method of warfare; in fact, all 
means were permissible to achieve a just cause.48  However, a general 
disapproval of a “Carthegenic solution”49 soon gave rise to limitations 
 43. Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality 
Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 
Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 163–64 (2002).  The rules of engagement are 
directives issued by a military authority that outline the circumstances and limitations 
under which troops will initiate or continue armed combat with opposing forces.  Id. 
 44. Linn, supra note 41, at 625–26. 
 45. Scholars such as St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suarez, Alberico 
Gentili, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotuis, and Emerich de Vattel developed the 
principles and requirements for a just war.  Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage 
on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and 
the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56 A.F. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
 46. Linn, supra note 41, at 627. 
 47. Id.  St. Augustine analyzed a war as one would analyze an individual 
defending an attack on another individual.  Coverdale, supra note 40, at 225.  Individuals 
can come to the defense of others being attacked, just as public entities may defend the 
common good with violence, no matter how lethal.  Id. 
 48. Under this theory, the first Crusade in 1095 would have been justified as an 
attempt by Pope Urban II to regain the Holy Land from the Turks, which they believed 
was unrightfully taken from Christian possession.  James Muldoon, Spiritual Freedom—
Physical Slavery: The Medieval Church and Slavery, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 69, 79 
(2005); see also PAUL RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: HOW SHALL 
MODERN WAR BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? 15–33 (1961) (arguing St. Augustine, believed to 
be the founder of the Christian theory of just war, promoted no limitations on the 
methods of warfare). 
 49. JOHN PREVAS, HANNIBAL CROSSES THE ALPS: THE INVASION OF ITALY AND THE 
PUNIC WARS 1 (1998). The “Carthaginian solution” refers to the Roman destruction of 
the Carthaginian civilization with complete disregard for both combatants and civilians.  
Romans took apart the city stone by stone, killed or enslaved all citizens, and salted the 
area to prevent civilization from growing again.  Id. 
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on the methods of combat.50  In addition to focusing on the jus ad 
bellum, theorists began to develop regulations on fair conduct in wars, or 
jus in bello.51  The doctrines of proportionality, military necessity, 
distinction, and humanity come from both of these early principles. 
The doctrine of proportionality is primarily concerned with the 
relationship between the moral and political purpose of war, jus ad 
bellum, and the destruction from the methods of war, jus in bello.52  
Fundamental to the doctrine is that the preferred end is proportional to 
the means used.53  This standard recognizes that there will be collateral 
damage during war, but directs commanders to balance the military 
advantage with the probability of civilian destruction.54  The 
conventions of jus in bello require that commanders minimize both the 
costs to their own troops as well as destruction for all parties concerned, 
while achieving their military go 55
Early Christian norms of warfare are tested in the doctrine of military 
necessity.  Military necessity limits commanders to attacking only 
legitimate military targets that will help them in gaining a military 
advantage over their enemy.56  Thus, some have argued that jus in bello 
regulations on fair conduct in wars can be ignored entirely under the 
guise of military necessity, particularly that any attack can be carried out 
so long as it increases the commander’s chances of defeating the 
enemy.57  However, military necessity requirements cannot be imposed 
 50. FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 156–57 (1975).  
The Second Lateran Council of 1139 banned the use of crossbows, bows and arrows, and 
siege machines, possibly to limit unnecessary suffering.  Id. 
 51. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Ius Ad 
Bellum and Ius In Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221 (1983) (examining how ius ad bellum 
and ius in bello operate simultaneously during a conflict). 
 52. Coverdale, supra note 40, at 268–69. 
 53. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 391, 393–94 (1993). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Coverdale, supra note 40, at 269.  Minimizing destruction or using the least 
amount of force necessary to achieve a particular aim is central in the proportionality 
requirement.  Id.  However, it is unclear under this principle whether commanders must 
put their troops in greater danger in order to minimize injuries to noncombatants.  Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, The Third Annual Grotius Lecture: Just War and Humanitarian 
Intervention, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 9 (2001). 
 56. Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current 
Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L. REV. 143, 
147 (2001). 
 57. Coverdale, supra note 40, at 273. 
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 a military victory.  
 
apart from the other jus in bello restraints on modern warfare.58  
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention does not hold military necessity 
above all other rules of war, and thus, attacking civilians or carrying out 
indiscriminate attacks can never be justified solely because it was 
necessary to lead to 59
The doctrines of distinction and humanity also arise from these early 
Christian principles.60  Distinction dictates that commanders must wage 
wars only against military combatants and not against the civilian 
populations.61  Humanity urges commanders to minimize unnecessary 
civilian suffering.62  In the Middle Ages, the jus in bello restraints 
urging civilian immunity were embodied in the codes of chivalry.63  
While one might assume that there was a moral basis for this belief that 
civilians are outside of the scope of war, the early reasons for immunity 
were actually more practical.64  At the time, combat arose between 
knights and their supporting armies, so there was no incentive to attack a 
civilian who had no connection to the knight’s infantries.65  Further, 
attacking a civilian population would be seen as lacking in chivalry.66  
The practical distinction between armed combatants and noncombatants 
remained when warfare was restricted to professional armies.67  
Professional armies were largely removed from society and combat was 
confined to small designated fields.68  Armies had few rational 
incentives to attack civilians since struggles were limited to battles 
among princes rather then fights engulfing entire communities.69  This 
clear line between armed combatants and civilians blurred as 
technological advancements made assaults by and upon entire 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 273–74. 
 60. Meyer, supra note 56, at 146. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 25. 
 63. Coverdale, supra note 40, at 261. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  The code of chivalry directed knights in the Middle Ages to help the weak 
in addition to promoting reciprocal rights and privileges in combat.  See William 
Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11th Proposal to Rationalize the 
Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 699–701 (2004).  See generally RICHARD BARBER, THE 
KNIGHT AND CHIVALRY (1982). 
 66. Coverdale, supra note 40, at 261–62.  Chivalry, which bound knights with a 
code of behavior that promoted honor, virtue, loyalty, and courage, was a central feature 
of life in the Middle Ages.  C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters But Should Marriage?: 
Adultery, Fraternization, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 177, 257–58 
(1999); see also DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (4th ed. 1996). 
 67. James M. Donovan, Civilian Immunity and the Rebuttable Presumption of 
Innocence, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 409, 414–15 (2004). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Coverdale, supra note 40, at 261–62. 
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not be absolute given the practicalities 
of war.  
agreements.   Customary laws of armed conflict bind every country in 
 
municipalities more practical, and consequently more common.70  Though 
the physical distance from combat no longer separated armies from the 
civilians, the principle of civilian immunity was upheld.71  International 
law expressly prohibits indiscriminate attacks or strikes in which 
combatants use imprecise weapons that kill civilians and combatants 
alike.72  However, as seen in the principles of proportionality and 
necessity, civilian immunity can
73
B.  Codification of the Rules of War 
Though the rules of war were primarily established under the 
Christian just war theory, regulations on warfare were not formally 
codified for centuries.74  There are a number of inherent complexities in 
international law.  Unlike domestic law, there are no international bodies 
with the authority to unilaterally make and enforce international legislation.75  
Instead, international law arises from countries freely waiving their 
sovereignty and agreeing to follow international norms.76  Today, the 
rules of warfare are established in treaties and customary international 
law.77  There are now many legally binding international agreements, 
but many countries choose not to become signatories of such 
78
 70. Donovan, supra note 67, at 415. 
 71. Id.  Christian tradition explicitly protected farmers, laborers, pilgrims, and 
clergy from attack because they did not traditionally bear arms or participate in unjust 
aggression.  Similarly, children who were unable to bear arms were presumed innocent 
and therefore shielded from attack.  Id. 
 72. Meyer, supra note 56, at 147. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial 
Precision Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 436 (2004).  Formal regulations on 
the laws of war were not drafted until the industrial wars of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Id.  The Industrial Revolution and the emerging modern nation-state 
system brought a marked change from pre-eighteenth-century isolated battlefield 
conflicts.  See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990).  
The advent of railroads provided the infrastructure for nations to mobilize considerably 
larger numbers of weapons and troops when taking on enemy forces.  This increasingly 
important technology also became a valuable military target and regulations were needed 
to formalize laws on the changing battlefield.  Id. 
 75. Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of 
War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 244 (2001). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
MYERS POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 4/22/2008  1:54:02 PM 
 
318 
odify these customs. 
 
the world, regardless of what treaties they have signed.79  However, the 
general principles that make up customary law are binding only to the 
extent that nations feel a legal obligation to follow such norms.80  
Additionally, there is no established international law that either by 
treaty or custom requires that unlawful combatants, such as militias or 
terrorist cells, be provided the same protection given to lawful 
combatants.81  However, while terrorists may not receive the protection 
of international law, nations still strive to adhere to the laws of war in 
order to adequately protect civilian noncombatants.82  The historical 
acceptance of the norms of armed conflict can be seen by examining the 
efforts to c
The first modern effort to codify international rules of war began with 
eleven nations signing the first Geneva Red Cross Convention in 1864 in 
order to provide clear protection for medical personnel on the battlefield.83  
 79. Further, if a treaty is considered to embody customary international law, its 
terms would bind and be enforced against nonsignatories.  Seth Brugger, International 
Law, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Finding and Filling the Gaps, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 803, 812–13 (2005). 
 80. See Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable 
Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict, 50 A.F. L. REV. 1, 43 (2001).  
The rules of war are based on the anticipation of equal application.  A party to a conflict 
complies with the rules of war because it anticipates its opponent will reciprocate, non 
facio ne facias.  Id.  There are no historical examples of one party binding itself to the 
law of armed conflict without declaring and expecting reciprocity.  The denial of equal 
application and reciprocity would render all laws of armed conflict meaningless.  “As Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht [noted], ‘it is impossible to visualize the conduct of hostilities in 
which one side would be bound by rules of warfare without benefiting from them and the 
other side would benefit from rules of warfare without being bound by them.’”  Id. 
(quoting H. Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 206, 212 (1953)).  While the United Nations has authority to enforce international 
laws, the U.N. does not operate as a “global police officer.”  Id. at 42.  As one commentator 
notes, “International law is unenforceable; it lacks a legal system that backs its laws with 
the trappings of justice, courts, juries, police, prisons, etc.”  Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in 
Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243, 281–82 (1987). 
 81. Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, 
Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 
1–2 (2004). 
 82. See Herthel, supra note 75, at 248–49. 
 83. Herthel, supra note 75, at 245–46.  While the Geneva Red Cross Convention 
was the first international attempt in codifying the laws of war, the first comprehensive 
regulation of the laws of war occurred a year earlier in the United States.  Id. at 245–46 
n.111.  In 1863, President Lincoln directed Dr. Francis Lieber to draft a code of 
customary warfare in order to minimize the atrocities occurring in the U.S. Civil War.  
Meyer, supra note 56, at 148.  Union Army General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, more commonly known as The 
Lieber Code, articulated the principles of necessity and distinction by preventing the 
targeting of civilians, calling for minimizing civilian damage, and limiting targets to 
those that provided a military advantage.  Id.  The manual was adopted by Germany, 
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Four years later, the St. Petersburg Declaration was drafted to regulate 
the use of weapons; notably, the Declaration was the first of its kind to 
promote the principle of distinction.84  While the Declaration was 
an important advancement, in reality, it merely presented the conceptual 
belief that war should be focused on military objectives rather than 
civilians.85  It was the advancement of air power that raised awareness of 
potential devastation and compelled the international community to 
expressly regulate the use of weapons.86 
The existing regulations of armed conflict are primarily found in the 
Hague Conventions of 1907,87 the Geneva Conventions of 194988 and its 
France, and Great Britain and later codified at the Brussels Convention of 1874.  
Reynolds, supra note 45, at 8. 
 84. Herthel, supra note 75, at 246.  In its Preamble, the St. Petersburg Declaration 
of 1868 states: 
[T]he only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy; 
    . . . it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; 
    . . . this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; 
    . . . the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws 
of humanity . . . . 
The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 95, 95 (1907). 
 85. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 9. 
 86. While air power began with simple balloon reconnaissance, aerial bombardment 
was anticipated as the next potentially destructive progression.  Id. 
 87. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2259, 1 Bevans 619; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; Convention Concerning Bombardment by 
Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, 1 Bevans 681.  Collectively, 
I will refer to these as the Hague Conventions.  The Second Hague Peace conference of 
1907 was the first to expressly codify civilian immunity.  J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND 
WAR RIGHTS 228–29 (3d ed. 1947).  The Hague Conferences of 1923 and 1938 
attempted to develop a more coherent set of rules following the World War I Italian 
strategy of attacking civilian populations to defeat enemy morale, but they failed to 
garner adequate support.  Id. 
 88. The 1949 Geneva Conventions are: Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85.  Collectively, I will refer to these as the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  The 
1949 Geneva Conventions addressed the actions in World War II, namely the deliberate 
targeting of civilian populations to reduce morale and the enormous and indiscriminate 
civilian deaths that arose from the atomic bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
RONALD SCHAFER, WINGS OF JUDGMENT: AMERICAN BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II 95–97, 




Protocols,89 and the Conventional Weapons Treaty of 198090 along with 
its Protocols.91  The Hague Conventions and Conventional Weapons 
Treaty regulate the methods of combat, particularly the weapons used.92  
The Geneva Conventions were centered on protecting the wounded and 
sick in war, prisoners of war, and civilians.93 
The most recent and comprehensive effort to regulate the conduct of 
war, and the source of focus for this Comment, is found in Protocol I of 
the Geneva Convention.94  Protocol I expanded the initial aim of the 
convention, which was to protect civilians and wounded prisoners,95 to 
include the basic principles of proportionality, military necessity, distinction, 
and humanity.  These four principles are fundamental in assessing the 
legality of armed combat. 
The doctrine of proportionality requires that the amount of force used 
in response to an attack be roughly proportionate to the precipitating 
events.96  Victims are not required to turn the other cheek following a 
terrorist strike, but there are limits to the amount of force that can be 
used in response.97  While the use of force must be proportionate to the 
terrorist attack, the definition of proportionality is subject to various 
interpretations, and the propriety of a nation’s military response is 
103 (1985).  These Conventions specifically provided the basis for neutral zones to 
house injured combatants and civilians, and gave protection to civilian hospitals which 
provided care to the injured.  Randy W. Stone, Protecting Civilians During Operation 
Allied Force: The Enduring Importance of the Proportional Response and NATO’s Use 
of Armed Force in Kosovo, 50 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 501, 509 (2001).  They also directed 
occupiers to take care of the occupied civilian population by providing food and medical 
supplies.  Id. 
 89. Protocol I, supra note 13. 
 90. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1524. 
 91. Herthel, supra note 75, at 247–48. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Protocol I, supra note 13.  Approximately twenty-four member countries of the 
United Nations, including the United States, Israel, France, Turkey, and the Philippines 
have failed to ratify Protocol I, but many principles in the Protocol are generally 
recognized as consistent with customary international law.  W. Hays Parks, Book 
Review, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 675, 676 (1993) (reviewing EDWARD K. 
KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL 
FIELDS OF APPLICATION (1992)).  However, the Protocol’s application of some major 
principles to aerial combat are often viewed as aspirational, and not as a codification of 
international customary norms.  Id.; see also Hans-Peter Gasser, The U.S. Decision Not 
to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims: An 
Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 912 (1987). 
 95. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 9; see also Parks, supra note 38, at 17–27. 
 96. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 183. 
 97. Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309, 316 (1989). 
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likely to vary considerably depending on the test used to determine 
proportionality.98 
The doctrine of military necessity states that forces must not strike 
military objectives unless those forces will achieve a definite military 
advantage by doing so.99  This principle is centered on how targets are 
identified and how commanders should measure military advantages 
before striking.100  Article 52(2) of Protocol I limits attacks to “those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture 
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.”101  Additionally, military planners are limited to strikes 
in which the anticipated military advantage outweighs the anticipated 
collateral damage.102  Commanders must therefore weigh the military 
advantage against the destruction of civilian lives and property before 
pursuing any military attack.103  This doctrine provides a justification for 
killing civilians in war, so long as their deaths are not intended but 
accidental.104  Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I states that nations are 
prohibited from launching strikes that are likely to cause “incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”105  Commanders 
are required, under Article 57(2), to “take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any 
 98. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 183. 
 99. Herthel, supra note 75, at 248.  The U.S. Air Force defines military necessity 
as “the principle which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by 
international law which are indispensable for securing the prompt submission of the 
enemy, with the least possible expenditures of economic and human resources.”  
Canestaro, supra note 74, at 454 (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW—THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, Air Force Pamphlet 
110-31, Nov. 1976, at paras. 1–3(a)1).  The Lieber Code, first promulgated in 1863, 
states: “Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed 
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed 
contests of the war . . . .”  Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field, art. 15, in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3, 6 (Dietrick 
Schindler & Jiří Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988). 
 100. Herthel, supra note 75, at 248. 
 101. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52. 
 102. Herthel, supra note 75, at 248–49. 
 103. Bernard L. Brown, Note, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian 
Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification, 10 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 134, 140 (1976). 
 104. Herthel, supra note 75, at 248. 
 105. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51. 
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vilian objects.”  
event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to ci 106
Finally, Protocol I emphasizes the principles of distinction and 
humanity.  Distinction requires that military targets are distinguished 
from civilian objects so that civilian populations are appropriately 
protected.107  The doctrine of humanity states that commanders have a 
duty to protect both combatants and civilians from unnecessary suffering.108  
Article 51(4)(c) prohibits indiscriminate assaults on civilians, specifically 
“those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited . . . [and] are of a nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”109  In 
order to protect civilian populations, Article 48 requires commanders 
to discriminate amongst their targets.110  In other words, the commanders 
must “distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and . . . direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”111  While the principle of 
discrimination would theoretically afford complete civilian immunity 
from combat,112 the practicalities of war promote the need for the 
principles of necessity and proportionality as well. 
The driving source behind the Protocols must also be considered when 
analyzing the legitimacy of attacks, particularly since the Protocols often 
use language that is inconsistent with prior state practice.113  The 
drafting of the Protocols began in the 1950s when the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),114 the Institute of International 
 
 106. Id. art. 57. 
 107. Herthel, supra note 75, at 248.  The principle of distinction is deemed to be 
generally accepted as a rule of law, though at that time it was not considered necessary to 
incorporate it into The Hague or Geneva Conventions.  Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles over 
Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary Norm Requiring the Use of Precision 
Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 146 (2000).  The ICRC commentary 
concludes: “The rule is included in this Protocol to verify the distinction required and the 
limitation of attacks on military objectives.”  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 598 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
 108. Herthel, supra note 75, at 249. 
 109. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51. 
 110. Id. art. 48. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Meyer, supra note 56, at 146. 
 113. Id. at 161–62. 
 114. The ICRC was established in 1863 in Geneva, Switzerland as an “impartial, 
neutral and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect 
the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with 
assistance.”   ICRC.org, The ICRC’s Mission Statement, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/site 
eng0.nsf/htmlall/section_mandate?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).  Now the 
organization exists in about eighty countries in the world.  Id. 
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Law, and the United Nations all put forth numerous proposals to limit, if 
not prohibit, aerial warfare entirely.115  Though these proposals were 
presented to the international community, support was weak and the 
proposals were criticized as unrealistic.116  In 1974, in the wake of the 
Vietnam War, the ICRC took up this cause again in a three-year 
conference called The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, which resulted in Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva 
Convention.117  The origins of the Protocol raise questions about 
whether the language truly reflects customary international law or rather 
efforts to limit the use of aerial warfare. 
 
It is understood that civilian casualties are unavoidable, but Protocol I 
attempts to minimize civilian injury by relying on principles of proportionality, 
necessity, distinction, and humanity.  These principles will be examined 
fully in Parts IV, V, and VI, and applied to the Israeli action in Lebanon 
to determine if the strikes against Hezbollah were consistent with 
Protocol I and customary international law. 
IV.  DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
The doctrine of proportionality states that the amount of force used in 
response to an attack must be roughly proportionate to the precipitating 
 115. Parks, supra note 74, at 64.  The position of the ICRC calling for disarmament 
was a marked change from their original role as a protector of civilians.  Id. at 66.  
Support from the major powers was tepid at best, so members of the ICRC instead 
sought their main support from Third World nations.  Id.  Developing nations comprised 
more than 60% of the delegations present and frequently used the threat of walking out 
as leverage throughout the four sessions of the Diplomatic Conference.  Id. at 79 n.264 
(citing B. NOSSITER, THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR MORE: THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS WITH 
RICH NATIONS (1987)).  Developed Western nations were stymied by their inability to 
present a unified front, and were worried about being seen as antihumanitarian if they 
opposed such restrictions.  The U.S. delegation was chiefly aware of its image, 
particularly since it sought to uphold the Carter administration’s emphasis on human 
rights.  Id. 
 116. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense specifically warned against 
such unrealistic prohibition of aerial attacks, citing the failed 1923 Hague Rules that 
attempted to impose similar restrictions.  Meyer, supra note 56, at 161.  Also, the ICRC 
was made up entirely of Swiss citizens.  Parks, supra note 74, at 67.  Switzerland, a 
neutral nation, had not sent citizens into combat since 1798.  Id.  There was strong 
resistance to permit individuals with little military training and no combat experience to 
shape the complex regulations of armed conflict.  Id. 
 117. Parks, supra note 74, at 75–82. 





events.118  This Part examines the different methods commonly employed 
to determine if a response is proportionate.  Additionally, this Part 
suggests an appropriate definition of proportionality in the context of 
combating international 
A.  Interpreting Proportionate 
International law does not allow terrorists to attack targets with 
impunity.  While victims are not required to turn the other cheek following 
a terrorist strike, there are limits to the amount of force that can be used 
in response.119  In order for the response to comply with international 
law, the force used must be proportionate to the precipitating event.120 
While the use of force must be proportionate to the terrorist attack, the 
definition of proportionality is subject to various interpretations.121  The 
propriety of a nation’s military response is likely to vary considerably 
depending on the test used to determine proportionality.  In deciding 
whether an attack is proportionate to the preceding incident, scholars 
have typically applied one of three approaches: (1) the “tit-for-tat” or 
quantitative test; (2) the cumulative test; or (3) the deterrent proportionality 
test.122 
1.  Tit-for-Tat Test 
Under the tit-for-tat quantitative approach, the proportionality of the 
response is judged in comparison to the immediate preceding terrorist 
strike.123  The response must be roughly equivalent to the number of 
deaths and amount of destruction caused by the precipitating incident.124  
Using this approach, it is inappropriate to consider prior patterns of 
aggression beyond the last act or any potential deterrent value of the 
response.125  If the response to the preceding act exceeds the amount of 
force that is strictly necessary to counter that attack, the response is 
illegally disproportionate under the tit-for-tat approach.126  This test 
 118. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 183. 
 119. Schachter, supra note 97, at 316. 
 120. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 183. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 80, at 281–82 (discussing the tests for 
assessing proportionality). 
 123. See, e.g., Schachter, supra note 97, at 315.  “The U.N. Security Council in 
several cases, most involving Israel, has judged proportionality by comparing the 
response on a quantitative basis to the single attack which preceded it.”  Id. 
 124. Roberts, supra note 80, at 281. 
 125. See Schachter, supra note 97, at 315. 
 126. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal 
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 177, 206 (1987); see also Alberto R. Coll, The 
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adopts the most restrictive definition for proportionality of the three 
commonly applied approaches. 
Applying the tit-for-tat approach to the current Israel-Lebanon conflict 
requires balancing all Israeli actions in Lebanon against Hezbollah’s 
initial July 12, 2006 provocations127 and asking whether Israel did more 
than necessary to counteract the threats it faced.128  The tit-for-tat approach 
is more likely than the other two possible approaches to indicate a 
disproportionate response because it advocates the most narrow 
interpretation of proportionality. 
2.  Cumulative Test 
The cumulative test allows one to consider not only the immediate act 
of aggression, but also a continuing pattern of attacks when assessing the 
proportionality of the military response.129  This approach can be 
significantly more expansive when there have been a number of previous 
incidents that have led up to the current response.130  The cumulative test 
still does not allow one to take into consideration the utilitarian concepts 
of general or specific deterrence when determining the proportionality of 
the response.131 
Under this approach, the “[r]ough equivalence in the number of deaths 
and extent of property damage remains the sine qua non of proportionality.”132  
However, this does not mean that if terrorists attack a day care center 
housing children, nations can respond by attacking the children of the 
terrorists.133  The rough equivalence in terms of deaths and damage does 
Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 297, 299 (1987) (noting that deterrence, which is inconsistent with the tit-for-tat 
approach, was one of the key objectives of the military response against Libya because 
the United States hoped to “persuade Libya and any other similarly inclined actors in the 
international community that the support of terrorist activities against the United States is 
bound to trigger an American response prohibitively costly to such actors”). 
 127. See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. DOC. 
S/2006/560 (July 21, 2006) (describing the beginning of the Israel-Lebanon conflict). 
 128. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 184 (applying the tit-for-tat approach to U.S. 
actions in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks). 
 129. Schachter, supra note 97, at 315. 
 130. See Bonafede, supra note 43, at 184. 
 131. See Schachter, supra note 97, at 315. 
 132. Roberts, supra note 80, at 281. 
 133. Id. at 281–82 (noting that the status of certain classes of persons—for example, 
children—protects them from retaliation). 




not suggest that reprisals against protected groups and objects are allowed 
merely because the terrorists chose to violate the laws of war.134 
In order for previous attacks to qualify, they must be part of an “overall 
plan of attack that relies on numerous small raids.”135  Advocates of this 
approach argue that it makes little sense to require nations to respond to 
each and every minor attack with a roughly equivalent response.136  As 
long as the previous attacks by terrorists are based on the same overall 
plan, a large retaliatory strike, proportionate to the sum of their smaller 
attacks, would be justified. 
Applying the cumulative test to the current Israel-Lebanon conflict 
allows Israel to include a host of prior terrorist attacks, rather than simply 
the last attack, in evaluating the proportionality of the response.  Israel 
could include the previous cross-border attacks and troop kidnappings 
that took place prior to July 2006 in addition to other terrorist acts that 
could be seen as part of a continuing pattern of attacks.  These previous 
terrorist strikes would be included with the immediately preceding strike 
in assessing the proportionality of the response. 
What remains unclear is how far back in time Israel can go in including 
previous Hezbollah acts of terror, or whether prior attacks that have 
already solicited a military response can be included in the equation.137  
As cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into Israel have occurred 
as far back as 1968, a considerable number of incidents could conceivably 
factor into the calculation.138  The more events that are included as being 
part of a continuing pattern of attacks, the less likely it is that the 
response was disproportionate. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 282. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 184.  In applying the cumulative proportionality 
theory to the U.S. response to September 11, questions have been raised as to whether 
the 1993 strike on the World Trade Center, the 1998 African embassy bombings, and the 
attack on the U.S.S. Cole could be considered part of the same continuing pattern of 
attacks.  Id.  Additionally it is unclear whether the U.S. cruise missile strikes against 
Afghanistan and Sudan in response to these previous attacks made the events 
inappropriate for inclusion.  Id.  See also Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: 
The Case for Self-Defense Under International Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 
589 (2002) for a detailed discussion of the legality of America’s use of force in response 
to the September 11 attacks, which argues that “[w]hile some [have criticized] America’s 
previous uses of force against terrorist supporting states, the case for America’s forcible 
response to the September 11 attacks as being fully consistent with the inherent right of 
self-defense under customary international law and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is very 
strong.” 
 138. For a summary of the development of the conflict with Lebanon, see Julie M. 
Peteet, Lebanon: Palestinian Refugees in the Post-War Period, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, 
Dec. 1997, available at http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/region-lebanon-refugee. 
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3.  Deterrent Proportionality Test 
The deterrent proportionality test considers the response in terms of 
the goal of deterring future terrorist attacks.139  One scholar has remarked 
that this approach allows force that would “be sufficient to cause the 
terrorist to change his expectations about costs and benefits [such] that 
he would cease terrorist activity.”140  Because proportionality is judged 
not in relation to the harm caused by previous terrorist attacks, but in 
terms of the overall goal of ending terrorist strikes, the amount of force 
used in response to an attack could potentially exceed the force exhibited 
in the initial terrorist strike. 
The deterrent proportionality test is not without its share of critics.141  
Some argue that determining proportionality based on a speculative 
assessment of how the terrorists will behave in the future is too lax of a 
standard.142  In their view, a concrete basis for comparison is necessary 
in order to calculate the proportionality of the response.143  Without a 
concrete starting point, such as the harm caused by previous attacks 
following the same overall plan or the harm caused by the last attack, 
there is no basis for comparison.144  An unsubstantiated belief that a huge 
terrorist attack could occur in the future might justify a frighteningly 
large response under this approach.  As the future wrong is yet to occur, 
the critics feel that justifying a preventative retaliatory response is 
inappropriate.145 
Applying the deterrent proportionality test to the Israel-Lebanon 
conflict allows Israel to include any potential deterrent value of the 
response in assessing proportionality.  The question becomes whether 
Israel’s retaliatory response was proportional to the end it sought—the 
cessation of attacks.146  This approach favors Israel’s response more than 
any of the previously discussed methods. 
 139. Schachter, supra note 97, at 315. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Roberts, supra note 80, at 282. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Schachter, supra note 97, at 315. 




4.  Combination of Tests 
Scholars have also suggested combining the previously articulated 
tests.147  Under a combined approach of both the cumulative and 
deterrent tests, military retaliation is weighed against the immediately 
preceding attacks as well as the probability and magnitude of future 
attacks.148  The cumulative-deterrent approach would result in an even 
more flexible standard than either the cumulative or deterrent test 
standing alone. 
B.  The Most Appropriate Definition 
The appropriate standard for assessing the proportionality of Israel’s 
response to a continuing pattern of terrorist attacks is the cumulative-
deterrent approach.149  The tit-for-tat and cumulative approaches alone 
are unworkable in combating terrorism.  It is illogical to force Israel to 
wait for terrorists to attack so that they can have a concrete basis to 
determine proportionality and then limit their response to the amount of 
damage caused by the terrorists. 
International terrorist organizations are fundamentally different from 
nation-states.150  While negotiations, sanctions, embargoes, and other 
diplomatic methods are available to discourage hostile nation-states, 
these alternatives are not possible against modern terrorist regimes that 
cross international boundaries.151  With the normal arsenal of diplomatic 
measures unavailable to persuade terrorist organizations, the only alternative 
is proactive engagement.152 
Both the tit-for-tat and cumulative approaches mandate a reactionary 
response that is unrealistic for combating modern terrorist regimes.  It is 
inappropriate to view the proportionality doctrine as requiring nations to 
either wait until they are attacked or have evidence that an attack is 
virtually certain to occur before allowing them to respond when reasonable 
 147. Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to 
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25, 47 (1987); see 
also Bonafede, supra note 43, at 185. 
 148. Baker, supra note 147, at 47. 
 149. Id. (advocating the cumulative deterrent approach in assessing the U.S. 
military response against a continuing pattern of attacks by Libya). 
 150. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 196–97. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 197; see also President George W. Bush, State of the 
Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases 
/2002/01/20020129-11.html (“I will not wait on events, while dangers gather.  I will not 
stand by as peril draws closer and closer.”). 
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preemptive measures can prevent the attack from occurring.153  Common 
sense dictates that it is irrational to allow terrorist groups to “fester and 
grow” after they have expressly indicated that their sole purpose is a 
state’s destruction.154  As it is not always possible to obtain concrete 
evidence that an attack is imminent, in certain cases the mere existence 
of terrorists camps may need to be a sufficient justification for military 
action. 
Requiring the rough equivalence in terms of force and damage is also 
ineffective in combating terrorism.  If a terrorist group places a bomb on 
a bus and kills ten civilians, it would be ineffective to limit the response 
to the same amount of casualties when the organization has thousands 
of members training for the next terrorist strike.  It is futile to limit a 
military response to the exact same amount of causalities and financial 
damage caused by a terrorist strike, and the potential deterrent value 
from an attack should be included in assessing proportionality. 
As Hezbollah had amassed over four thousand rockets which were 
fired at Israel, it is apparent that Lebanon was either unable or unwilling 
to control the group within its borders.155  This tacit support for the 
organization means that Israel’s only option to prevent future attacks 
was by engaging Hezbollah directly.  Given the unthinkable loss of life 
that could potentially occur when a terrorist group is this well armed, 
Israel’s response appears proportional to the threat it faced coupled with 
the deterrent effect that it achieved.156 
Interpreting the proportionality requirement as allowing the 
cumulative-deterrent approach with respect to international terrorist 
organizations does not mean that the proportionality requirement is 
 153. Former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz commented: “A nation attacked 
by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks . . . .  The U.N. 
Charter is not a suicide pact.  The law is a weapon on our side, and it is up to us to use it 
to its maximum extent.”  Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, 86 DEP’T 
STATE BULL. 15, 17 (1986). 
 154. Bonafede, supra note 43, at 200. 
 155. Uzi Rubin, Hizballah’s Rocket Campaign Against Northern Israel: A Preliminary 
Report, JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/ brief006-
10.htm (“From July 13 to August 13, the Israeli Police reported 4,228 rocket impacts 
inside Israel from rockets fired by Hizballah.  No geographical area in the world has 
sustained such a large quantity of rocket strikes since the Iran-Iraq war in the early 
1980s.”). 
 156. Israel’s response appeared to alter Hezbollah’s expectations about the costs of 
terrorist activity.  Bazzi, supra note 1.  Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah said in 
an interview on Lebanese TV in August 2006 that he would not have ordered the troops’ 
capture if he had known it would lead to a full-scale war with Israel.  Id. 




entirely meaningless.157  While calculating the amount of deterrence 
necessary to alter the terrorists’ behavior cannot be done with 
mathematical certainty using this approach, any response not clearly 
disproportionate to the provocation should satisfy the requirement.158 
V.  DOCTRINE OF MILITARY NECESSITY 
The doctrine of military necessity states that forces must not strike 
military objectives unless they will achieve a definite military advantage 
by doing so.159  In order to apply this principle to the Israel-Lebanon 
conflict, it is important to determine how targets are identified, particularly 
how dual use targets160 should be handled, and how commanders should 
measure military advantages before striking.161 
A.  Identifying Targets 
Before a commander can attack a perceived threat, the nature of the 
target must be examined to predict the potential military advantage and 
the potential civilian casualties.162  The targeting of a military establishment 
in the middle of a populous city could be permissible if the target is 
legitimate.163  Identifying targets becomes critical because of the potential 
collateral effects a strike could have on a civilian population.  In identifying 
possible targets, commanders must take into account the proximity to 
 157. “[T]he destruction of a city because of a single terrorist incident . . . would 
create revulsion and horror, even when the target state is seen as an enemy.”  Schachter, 
supra note 97, at 315. 
 158. FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 342 (1971). 
 159. Herthel, supra note 75, at 248.  The Lieber Code states, “Military necessity 
admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies and of other persons 
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war . . . .”  
Lieber, supra note 99, art. 15. 
 160. Dual use targets are those which are used simultaneously for civilian and 
military purposes.  Canestaro, supra note 74, at 455–56. 
 161. CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 654–55 (4th ed., Meredith Publ’g 
Co. 1965) (1924).  Mere necessity is not enough to avoid conforming to the rules of war.  
Id. at 655.  Otherwise, this principle of need would 
reduce[] the entire body of the laws of war to a code of military convenience, 
having no further sanction than the sense of honor of the individual military 
commander or chief of staff and no practical effect where the contending 
forces were sufficiently equal to render the issue doubtful. 
Id.; see also Hays Parks, Protection of Cultural Property From the Effects of War, in 
THE LAW OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND NATURAL HERITAGE: PROTECTION, TRANSFER 
AND ACCESS 3-1, 3-12 (Mary Phelan et al. eds., 1998) (quoting General Dwight 
Eisenhower who famously noted: “[T]he phrase ‘military necessity’ is sometimes used 
where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even personal 
convenience.  I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.”). 
 162. See Brown, supra note 103, at 145–46. 
 163. Id. at 146–47. 
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civilian life, the potential to cause substantial civilian damage, the 
military importance of the target, and the vulnerability of the object to 
the military attack.164 
Clarifying the meaning of the terms military objective or military 
target can be difficult given that nations often choose to define these 
terms according to their own interests; some nations, like the United 
States, have generally relied on Protocol I to clarify these terms.165  
Article 52(2) of Protocol I outlines two important factors to consider 
when determining whether an object should be subject to attack.166  
Attacks are (1) “limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and [(2)] 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”167  
Under this two-part definition, it is not sufficient that an object simply 
be useful from a military perspective.  The object’s destruction must also 
“offer a definite military advantage.”168 
Many objects, depending on the situation, have the potential to “make 
an effective contribution to military action.”169  Street lights, trees, railroads, 
or any other commonplace civilian structure could potentially be 
advantageous to the enemy combatants.170  While commanders must 
 164. Id. at 146.  The commander will be judged on the reasonability of his actions 
both to acquire adequate information and in light of the gathered information.  Matthew 
D. Thurlow, Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy 
Comports with International Law, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 170 (2005). 
 165. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 455. 
 166. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Françoise J. Hampson, Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The 
Doctrine of Proportionality and Necessity, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 39, 49 (1992).  For 
example, “[a] civilian’s hot-air balloon is of potential military usefulness, but whether it 
can be attacked depends on the circumstances.”  Id.  Whether a target offers a “definite 
military advantage” is subject to interpretation.  Id.  The implications of interpreting this 
term narrowly to include only specific tactical benefits or using the term broadly to 
include strategic and political advantages is discussed in depth in the following 
subsections. 
 169. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52. 
 170. The U.S. Operational Law Handbooks include targets which by their nature, 
location, purpose, or use could be used for military purposes.  Canestaro, supra note 74, 
at 455–56.   As the front lines of combat have changed, there have been dramatic 
alterations in both the quantity of targets available and the nature of the targets, as 
reflected by the NATO attack on Milošević’s private bank accounts.  Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Unexpected Consequences From Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard for Computer 
Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2003). 
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look at how critical the object is to the military campaign and whether 
they are likely to effectively destroy the target by striking it, there is no 
weighted calculation to determine what object may be hit or spared.171  
There would be great uncertainty in deciding which objects were 
immune from attack using these parameters, because a case could be 
made to attack virtually any object.  For example, striking a hot air 
balloon could make an effective contribution to military action, and it is 
unlikely to cause a large number of civilian casualties, thus under this 
analysis, it could be attacked.172 
The Protocol dictates that if there is doubt regarding an object that is 
normally dedicated to civilian activities, such as “a place of worship, a 
house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.”173  
This aspirational presumption not only differs from customary international 
law, but it actually encourages combatants to intentionally camouflage 
military objectives to look like civilian objects.174  Though the ICRC 
intended this provision to protect civilians, the language results in a 
civilian population at greater risk when attackers look for disguised 
civilian objects.175  Further, shifting the burden entirely on the attacker 
to identify civilian objects represents a historical departure from the 
rules of war as implemented during World War II, where both the 
attacker and defender shared this ob 176ligation.  
 
 171. There is no proportionality balancing test required when identifying an object: 
either it is of military use, or it will not provide any military advantage and thus, it must 
not be targeted.  Hampson, supra note 168, at 49.  In the midst of the stresses of battle, 
different commanders are likely to reach different conclusions about these matters.  See 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 149 (1999). 
 172. Hampson, supra note 168, at 49. 
 173. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52.  Further, if there is doubt as to a person’s 
status, he will be considered a civilian.  Canestaro, supra note 74, at 459.  This 
presumption of noncombatant status is not surprising considering that the protection of 
civilians is among the oldest tenants of war, and that civilian safety was the chief 
concern of the ICRC.  Id. at 449. 
 174. Parks, supra note 74, at 136. 
 175. Id. 
 176. This puts an unprecedented duty on the attacker to protect civilian property 
which is controlled by the defender.  Id. at 137.  Such an obligation seems impractical in 
the realities of war and illogical given that civilian lives are not afforded such deference.  
This is shown in the following hypothetical example: A plane is seriously damaged en 
route to a target and in order to stay operational, must jettison its bombs.  Id. at 148.  The 
pilot may either drop the bombs immediately on a playground full of children, or drop 
the artillery on a farmer’s barn.  Given the choice, there is no question civilian lives 
would be spared over the protection over any form of civilian property.  Protecting the 
life of even one child in the playground would take precedence over the property as it 
has throughout the history of war.  Thus, the choice to afford civilian property greater or 
even equal protection with civilian lives drastically departs from the customary rules of 
war.  Id. 
MYERS POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 4/22/2008  1:54:02 PM 
[VOL. 45:  305, 2008]  Fighting Terrorism 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 333 
Many problems arise when military objectives fall within the category 
of dual use targets.  Dual use targets are those which are used both for 
civilian and military purposes.177  These include airports, electricity 
generators, roads, and bridges.  In the case of a road, civilians might 
simultaneously use a specific road to distribute goods while the military 
also uses the road to move weapons and machinery.  Protocol I does not 
expressly use the term dual use or specifically refer to simultaneously 
used objects.  However, it seems that even with a narrow interpretation 
of Article 52(2), almost every dual use target can be read as a legitimate 
military objective.178  An object that is used by the military would seem, 
by virtue of its “nature, location, purpose or use[, to] make an effective 
contribution to military action.”179  Fortunately, these factors alone are 
not determinative in calculating which objects can be attacked.  Whether 
or not a commander can attack a target depends on the second part of 
this test.180  A broad interpretation might support attacking targets such 
as bridges and roads not only to limit an enemy’s ability to function, but 
also to affect the morale of the civilian population.181  A narrow 
interpretation would limit strikes to only those targets which have a real-
time tactical advantage.182 
B.  Interpreting Definite Military Advantage 
The second step in determining whether a target is legitimate requires 
commanders to refrain from strikes that cause civilian casualties in 
excess of the definite military advantage anticipated.  Little guidance has 
been given, however, on how commanders should interpret a “definite 
military advantage.”183  The interpretation of this phrase is of the utmost 
 
 177. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 455–56. 
 178. The U.S. Operational Law Handbooks include objectives which, by their use, 
could be used for military advantage.  Id.  Thus, dual use civilian objects could lawfully 
be targeted.  Id. at 456. 
 179. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52. 
 180. That is, the definite military advantage anticipated from striking the object.  
Hampson, supra note 168, at 49. 
 181. See Meyer, supra note 56, at 165–66. 
 182. Id. at 166. 
 183. Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 51, 57.  In fact, further complicating this 
subjective element, some lawful targets may wax and wane in importance over the 
duration of the conflict.  Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The 
Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213, 228–29 
(1998) (noting how the military necessity for attacking irrigation dams during the Korean 




importance, as it will ultimately determine whether an attack passes the 
proportionality test.184  The two approaches commonly used are the 
cumulative approach and the case-by-case basis.185 
1.  Cumulative Approach 
If “definite military advantage” is interpreted broadly, or on a 
cumulative basis, strikes are not limited to those only providing an 
immediate tactical advantage but can include attacks which are expected 
to bring a general strategic advantage.186  More generally, in deciding 
whether to strike a particular object under the cumulative approach, one 
would weigh the overall anticipated civilian losses from a strike against 
the anticipated overall gains to the military operation as a whole.187  
Many governments have been quick to clarify that they interpret 
“definite military advantage” to be measured cumulatively under Article 
52.188 
The British first articulated the broad cumulative interpretation of 
“definite military advantage” when signing the Protocol.189  This 
declaration stated that “in relation to paragraph 5(b) of Article 51 and 
paragraph (2)(a)(iii) of Article 57, . . . the military advantage anticipated 
from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the 
attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of the attack.”190  Canada similarly declared that “references in 
War became more important towards the end of conflict and how targets in Vietnam 
were bombed following failed peace negotiations in 1972). 
 184. Brown, supra note 103, at 141. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Commander Fenrick uses the February 1945 Allied attack on Dresden to 
illustrate the importance of strategic goals over simple calculated strikes.  William J. 
Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. 
REV. 91, 127 (1982).  On a tactical level, the attack offered negligible military advantage 
and cost 25,000 civilian lives.  Parks, supra note 74, at 176–77.  However, on the 
strategic level, the attack was enormously advantageous to disrupt German communication in 
the face of Soviet advances.  Id. at 177.  The Soviet winter offensive pushed the Russians 
close to Frankfurt, but left them vulnerable to flank attacks from the German Army that 
still occupied outer areas of the country.  Rebecca Grant, The Dresden Legend, A.F. 
MAG., Oct. 2004, at 64, available at http://www.afa.org/magazine/oct2004/1004dresden.pdf.  
Dresden had both rail and road lines of communication which, if attacked, would choke 
off transport and reinforcements from a possible German counterattack.  Parks, supra 
note 74, at 176–77.  The attack on Dresden produced a high amount of collateral damage, 
but also hastened the end of the war, thereby saving hundreds of thousands of lives.  Id. 
at 177.  The strategic advantage of bringing about the end of the war is arguably of 
greater significance than any tactical assessment.  Id. 
 188. Fenrick, supra note 187, at 107. 
 189. William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 539, 543 (1997). 
 190. Id. at 548. 
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Articles 46 [now 51] and 50 [now 57] to military advantage anticipated 
from an attack are intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the 
attack considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of that attack.”191 
The United States has not ratified the Protocol and thus has not made 
any formal declarations.192  However, U.S. commanders have justified 
attacks using the cumulative approach.193  Under the cumulative approach, 
the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 would be 
considered legitimate.  The civilian casualties from the bombing did not 
exceed the definite military advantage gained because the strike led to a 
prompt Japanese surrender and prevented a full-scale invasion.194  While 
the bombing did cause heavy civilian casualties and high collateral damage 
to objects without a tactical advantage, the strike was greatly advantageous 
from a strategic standpoint.195  The bombing is thus justified not by 
measuring the anticipated gain in relation to specific tactical advances 
from destruction of individual targets, but by measuring the advantage 
relative to the overall operation.196  A strike that ended the war and 
saved enormous casualties from a ground invasion would likely pass the 
cumulative interpretation of definite military advantage. 
Although most national governments have made it clear that “definite 
military advantage” should be interpreted broadly, there can be practical 
problems with using the cumulative approach.197  Calculations that are 
too broad and too abstract may be difficult to estimate in day-to-day 
real-time operations.198  A commander cannot accurately predict the 
entire strategic and psychological advantages of a particular strike in the 
 191. Fenrick, supra note 187, at 107. 
 192. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 456.  For additional discussion see generally Gasser, 
supra note 94 (urging the United States to ratify Protocol I). 
 193. The United States regards Article 52 as binding international customary law; 
however, it has generally rejected interpretations of the Protocol which limit strikes only 
to military gains that can be directly quantified.  Canestaro, supra note 74, at 456. 
 194. The United States estimated that sending in Allied troops for a full-scale 
ground invasion would cause Allied casualties exceeding 500,000.  Burrus M. Carnahan, 
The Law of Air Bombardment in Its Historical Context, 17 A.F. L. REV. 39, 56–57 
(1975). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Meyer, supra note 56, at 170–71. 
 197. Fenrick, supra note 187, at 107. 
 198. Id. 




context of the entire military campaign without the benefit of hindsight.199  
Further, it seems unlikely that military commanders could make such 
sweeping assessments before each combat strike.200  Applications that are 
too broad and attack calculations that can only be applied in hindsight 
are tools that cease to be useful in combat situations.201  While the 
cumulative approach becomes less helpful if applied too broadly, the 
case-by-case approach seems even less appropriate in determining 
whether there is military necessity for a given strike. 
2.  Case-by-Case Approach 
The case-by-case approach requires that the anticipated gain of each 
strike be measured by the specific military benefit gained in each 
attack.202  Under this approach, aerial campaigns are limited to individual 
targets that provide an immediate tactical advantage.203  Every road or 
bridge that is targeted must be one that is used or is very useful to the 
military combatants.204  Strategic or psychological advantages are 
not considered in making this calculation.205  Further, the ICRC Official 
Commentary notes that attacks must offer a real time advantage, but 
strikes that offer only a possible future advantage should not be 
considered.206 
 199. Id.  For example, it would be difficult to calculate the anticipated advantage 
from all Allied bombing raids in Germany in comparison to all estimated civilian casualties 
because the approach is too expansive.  Id. 
 200. The United States has adopted what as known as the Rendulic Rule, which 
evaluates a commander’s decision based on the reasonableness given the information 
available at the time.  Canestaro, supra note 74, at 457.  A commander must analyze the 
personnel and combat conditions and the information available to determine whether the 
target is a military objective and whether collateral damage would be appropriate in the 
situation.  Id. 
 201. Fenrick, supra note 187, at 107. 
 202. Brown, supra note 103, at 141. 
 203. Id.  The Protocol clarifies that the rules relating to the general protection of the 
civilian population “apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian 
population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land.”  Protocol I, supra note 13, 
art. 49(3).  The rules “further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against 
objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict at sea or in the air.”  Id. 
 204. Brown, supra note 103, at 141. 
 205. By striking terrorist targets in Libya in 1986, President Ronald Reagan sent the 
psychological message that the United States would no longer ignore state-sponsored 
terrorism.  Parks, supra note 74,  at 143.  While the strikes had military effect, these 
actions were primarily psychological, and did not necessarily result in a direct tactical 
advantage.  Id. 
 206. The ICRC Official Commentary states that “it is not legitimate to launch an 
attack which only offers potential or indeterminate advantages . . . .”  Parks, supra note 
74, at 141 (quoting COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 107, at 
636).  The Commentary also notes that definite “is a word of limitation denoting in this 
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Under this approach, the 1944 Allied aerial attacks on bridges and 
railroads in Pas de Calais would have been prohibited because they did 
not provide an immediate tactical advantage.207  In targeting Pas de Calais, 
the Allies sought to deceive the German troops by creating diversionary 
bombings.208  Deceiving the Germans into thinking that the Allied 
invasion would occur in Calais instead of Normandy provided great 
strategic advantages.209  However, because there was no immediate 
tactical advantage to targeting that infastructure other than to divert the 
German military efforts from Normandy, this operation would likely be 
regarded as an illegitimate and disproportionate target selection under 
the case-by-case approach.210 
In limiting targets to only those that provide a case-by-case tactical 
military advantage, relief agencies disregard the reality that a nation’s 
war effort is founded on goals that go beyond calculated military 
components.211  If one limits targets to only those in which the gains are 
tactically advantageous, then much of the purpose of warfare is being 
ignored.212  The purpose of armed conflict is not limited to merely 
 
context a concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and 
speculative one.”  Id. at 637. 
 207. W. Hays Parks, Conventional Aerial Bombing and the Law of War, U.S. 
NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1982, at 98, 114.  The deception operation Fortitude was 
carried out by representatives of various Allied intelligence agencies.  Ramon J. Farolan, 
Reveille: “Bloody Omaha,” PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, July 9, 2006, at 11.  These agents, 
known as the Double Cross Committee, fed the Germans with misinformation, making 
them believe that the real invasion would be carried out in the Pas de Calais, a logical 
area for attack since it was situated just across the English Channel.  Id.  Under 
Operation Fortitude, a Spanish double agent was able to gain the confidence of the 
Germans by giving them military information that was accurate but of little military 
importance.  Just before the Normandy invasion, the double agent sent word of the 
imminent attack at Normandy but also warned of a larger strike at Pas de Calais.  As a 
result, the German High Command held their forces in Calais instead of countering the 
Normandy landings.  A senior German officer described the error as the decision that 
lost the war for Germany.  Id. 
 208. Parks, supra note 74, at 176. 
 209. Id.  Normandy was the site of the largest seaborne invasion in history.  See 
Stephen E. Ambrose, The Battlescape of Normandy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, §5, at 
15.  On June 6, 1944, the D-Day invasion began with overnight parachute and glider 
landings, air and naval bombardment, and morning amphibious landings.  The invasion 
was costly in terms of casualties but the attack dealt the Germans one of the largest 
defeats of the war.  Strategically, the successful invasion secured a major front and 
forced the German troops out of most of France.  Id. 
 210. Parks, supra note 207, at 98, 114. 
 211. Reynolds, supra note 45, at 83–86. 
 212. Id. at 86. 
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defeating the enemy combatants; rather, nations seek to attain advantages 
that are not considered purely military in nature.213  “We don’t go to war 
merely to have a nice fight; rather, we go to war to attain something of 
political value to our organization.”214  War is often the means to a 
political end.  As Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian commander and one of 
Western civilization’s most famous military theorists, commented, “War is 
thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”215  Military 
operations that generate moral, diplomatic, or political gains have long 
been considered legitimate under the customary rules of war, despite 
lacking capture of territory.216 
Nongovernmental relief agencies have long questioned the legitimacy 
of the NATO strikes in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo because they 
did not all provide an immediate tactical advantage.217  Amnesty 
International adopted a limited interpretation of “military objective” and 
“military advantage” in criticizing a NATO strike on the Serb Radio and 
Television headquarters in Belgrade.  Amnesty called the strike “an 
attack on a civilian facility . . . constitut[ing] a war crime.”218  
 
 213. Military historian Sir Michael Howard has stated, “Wars are not simply acts of 
violence.  They are acts of persuasion or of dissuasion; and although the threat of 
destruction is normally a necessary part of the persuading process, such destruction is 
only exceptionally regarded as an end in itself.”  Parks, supra note 74, at 141 (quoting 
Michael Howard, Strategy and Policy in Twentieth-Century Warfare, in THE HARMON 
MEMORIAL LECTURES IN MILITARY HISTORY, 1959–1987, at 354 (1988)). 
 214. Meyer, supra note 56, at 167 (quoting John A. Warden III, The Enemy as a 
System, AIRPOWER J., Spring 1995, at 40, 43). 
 215. Linn, supra note 41, at 636 (quoting CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 83 
(Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., Everyman’s Library 1993) (1976)).  Von 
Clausewitz also noted that “[t]he destruction of the military forces of the enemy is not 
now and never has been the objective of war; it has been merely a means to an end—
merely the removal of an obstacle which lay in the path of overcoming the will to resist.”  
HAYWOOD S. HANSELL, JR., THE AIR PLAN THAT DEFEATED HITLER 33 (Arno Press Inc. 
1980) (1972). 
 216. Parks, supra note 74, at 141.  For example, the 1972 bombing missions of 
Linebacker II against targets in Hanoi commenced after the North Vietnamese delegation 
walked away from negotiations to end the war.  Id. at 142–43.  The targeting was not 
tactically advantageous, but was designed to pressure the North Vietnamese back to 
negotiations.  Id. at 143.  Eleven days after the raids, the North Vietnamese Government 
returned to the negotiating table and reached an agreement to end the war within three 
weeks.  Id. 
 217. Human Rights Watch (HRW) raised doubt on the legitimacy of several strikes 
of bridges conducted by NATO, proposing that targeted bridges “that are not central to 
transportation arteries or have a purely psychological importance” do not fall within 
Protocol I.  Meyer, supra note 56, at 165. 
 218. Id. at 166.  At a press conference after the bombing, NATO explained: 
    [We needed to] directly strike at the very central nerve system of 
[Milošević]’s regime.  These of course are those assets which are used to plan 
and direct and to create the political environment of tolerance in Yugoslavia in 
which these brutalities can not only be accepted but even condoned. . . .  
Strikes against TV transmitters and broadcast facilities are part of our 
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Amnesty’s aspirational promotions of civilian safety may be within a 
strict reading of Article 52 of the Protocol, but they may also 
demonstrate a departure from the customary definitions of military 
targets and what constitutes a contribution to military action.219  The 
state-controlled Serb Radio and Television headquarters was considered 
a high-impact strategic military target because it was being used by 
Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milošević, to disseminate propaganda for his 
ethnic cleansing campaign.220  The goal of NATO forces was to attain 
strategic and psychological goals, particularly to influence the Serb 
population and make Milošević more amenable to the coalition.221  
Cumulatively, these strikes were instrumental in ending the war.  
Following the repeated attacks, “[t]he Serbian population forced 
[Milošević] to call the war off when the life of the Serbian population 
was made very uncomfortable.”222  Thus, strategic and psychological 
targets that have a high political value can prove to be very useful in 
military operations, but if one uses the case-by-case approach and limits 
strikes to tactical advantages alone, effective and customary warfare 
tactics will be unnecessarily and incorrectly prohibited.  




3.  Analysis 
While Israel and Lebanon both incurred civilian losses and infrastructure 
damage from rocket, missile, and artillery attacks, this analysis will 
mainly focus on the legitimacy of Israel’s target selection.  Hezbollah’s 
actions of targeting civilians and using human shields raise fewer 
questio
ws. 
Israel conducted operations to cut off roads, bridges, airports, and 
campaign to dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery which is a vital part of 
President [Milošević]’s control mechanism. 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1277 (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter  
ICTY Report], available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm. 
 219. Meyer, supra note 56, at 165–67. 
 220. Meyer, supra note 56, at 165–66.  The attacks on the Serbian radio and 
television headquarters killed 16 people.   AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6. 
 221. Meyer, supra note 56, at 174–75. 
 222. James A. Kitfield, Another Look at the Air War That Was, A.F. MAG., Oct. 
1999, at 39, 42. 
 223. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 474. 
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y objectives depends on how broadly 
or
banese estimates are that between 80 and 120 bridges 
w
seaports to prevent Hezbollah from receiving aid that would arrive from 
Syria or Iran, Hezbollah’s main suppliers of weapons, money, and 
military training.224  By bombing Lebanese highways and bridges, Israel 
also made it harder for Hezbollah to move its mobile rocket launchers 
and to fire on Israeli cities.225  Whether these strikes on dual use targets 
are interpreted as legitimate militar
 narrowly the terms are defined. 
The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs explained that roads and 
bridges were targeted because “the roads in Lebanon are used to transport 
terrorists and weapons to the terror organizations operating from Lebanese 
territory against civilians in Israel.”226  The Lebanese government has 
estimated that 100 roads equaling roughly 200,000 square meters of road 
were destroyed.227  Amnesty International claimed that Israel closed the 
final road linking the country to Syria and denied a convoy carrying 150 
tons of aid into the region on August 4, 2006.228  Israel also destroyed 
bridges along Lebanon’s coastal roads to prevent Syria from rearming 
Hezbollah.229  Le
ere bombed.230 
Even using the narrowest possible interpretation of “military 
objective,” the destruction of roads and bridges would be justified.231  
Given that the roads and bridges were being used to supply arms and 
launch rockets into Israel, the destruction of this property would produce 
an “effective contribution to military action.”232  The roads and bridges 
are legitimate targets, and their destruction meets the definition of 
“military objective” under this first part of the paragraph.  The second 
paragraph limits those attacks to only strikes which offer a real-time 
 
 224. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 11–13.  Because of the nature of the terrorist 




ed except for UNIFIL and Red Cross vehicles.  Id. at 12. 
 a tree trunk as a bridge and a 
pplies.  Id. 
Hezbollah.  Id. at 11
 225. Id. a
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. However, Israel took many necessary precautions.  Id. at 12.  Israel distributed 
leaflets to civilians on August 7, 2006, stating that “any vehicle of any kind travelling 
south of the Litani River will be bombarded, on suspicion of transporting rockets, 
military equipment and terrorists.”  Id. at 18.  The Israeli military warned that all
 objects would be attack
 229. Id. at 12. 
 230. Amnesty International claims that Israel bombed the original and subsequent 
temporary bridge built between Tyre, Sidon, and Beiruit which cut off Lenanon’s fourth 
largest city from aid.  Id.  The group has also charged Israel with denying passage to a 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) convoy which used
human chain to pass along humanitarian su
 231. Brown, supra note 103, at 141. 
 232. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 4; see also Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52. 
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“definite military advantage.”233  It could be argued that if no combat 
was likely to occur in the area to which the bridge led or the road was 
not in a location which suppliers could use to rearm Hezbollah, then 
these roads and bridges were improperly destroyed.  Destruction that 
may only be hypothetically advantageous does not qualify as a military 
objective under Protocol I, because the destruction might not afford an 
actual military advantage.234  In reality however, it appears Israel bombed 
sources of transportation that were directly connected to overcoming the 
enemy forces, and their destruction thus offered an immediate and 
definite military advantage.  Israel’s targeting of roads and bridges was 
th
the terrorists.   Additionally, Israel struck three main seaports in 
 
erefore legitimate under Article 52 of the Protocol.235 
Amnesty International also argued that airports and seaports are 
illegitimate military objectives under the narrow interpretation.236  Israel 
has been heavily criticized for initiating an air and sea blockade of 
Lebanon for eight weeks in its attempt to cut off Hezbollah from military 
support from its suppliers in Iran and Syria.237  Lebanon’s main 
airport238 and other smaller airports were attacked in bombing raids, 
sometimes multiple times.239  The Beirut airport was an early target; aerial 
attacks destroyed fuel tanks and major runways, and while the main 
facilities and control tower were spared, the airport was inoperable.240  
Israel explained that it had targeted airports and the fuel tanks because 
they were the “central hub for the transfer of weapons and supplies” to 
241
 233. See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52. 
 234. Otherwise, Israel would have been within its right to destroy all bridges and 
roads in Lebanon because it might have eventually provided a military advantage.  
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 5. 
 235. Even if a target is considered a legitimate military objective within the 
definition of Article 52, the Protocol provides an exception that prohibits the destruction 
of objects that are indispensable to civilians.  Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 54.  However, the 
 food and water sources; bridges and roads Protocol only limits attackers from destroying
are not considered under the Protocol as indispensable to civilian survival.  Id. 
 236. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 5. 
 237. Id. at 18–19.  Lebanon’s economy is based on its role in the Middle East as a 
shipping hub and tourist destination for its oil-rich neighbors.  Scott Wilson & Edward 
Cody, Israel to End Blockade of Lebanon, W . P , Sept. 7, 2006, at A21.  The 
, dampened the civilian 
Beirut International Airport. 
as estimated the damage to the airports at $55 million. A
ASH  OST  
blockade  therefore, both inhibited terrorist movements and 
economy. 
 238. Lebanon’s main airport is 
 239. Lebanon h  MNESTY 
INT’L, supra note 6, at 13. 
 240. Id. at 13. 
 241. Id.  Amnesty International has accused Israel of having an ulterior motive in 




Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon and instituted a blockade at sea to prevent the 
shipment of 242
Like the legitimate targeting of roads and bridges, the targeting of 
airports and seaports was appropriate under the customary rules of war 
because the objectives were military in nature and were directly 
connected to defeating enemy combatants.243  The airports and seaports 
are major sources of transportation that are vital to enemy forces.  The 
targets would be considered legitimate “military objectives” under 
Article 52(2) because their destruction hampers the rearmament of the 
enemy and thus provides a definite military advantage.  Though Amnesty 
International has criticized such classifications of dual use targets as 
“[o]verbroad . . . to justify attacks aimed at harming the economy of a 
state or demoralizing the civilian population” and “undermin[ing] 
civilian immunity,”244 such criticism ignores the customary laws of war.  
The Israeli targeting of roads, bridges, airports, and seaports falls within 
customary rules of war and the overwhelming majority of interpretations 
nations take when applying the Protocol. 
VI.  DOCTRINES OF HUMANITY AND DISTINCTION 
The final main principles of war are the doctrines of humanity and 
distinction, which require nations to distinguish between combatants and 
civilians, and direct operations only against combatants.245  Distinction 
requires commanders to use weapons that are capable of discriminating 
between combatants and noncombatants.246  The doctrine of humanity 
states that commanders have a duty to protect both combatants and 
civilians from unnecessary suffering.247  While humanity and distinction 
 
bombing the airports, mainly that it was aiming to force the Lebanese government to pay 
for harboring Hezbollah.  As proof of the ulterior motive to harm the Lebanese 
government, Amnesty cites the IDF statement issued on July 14, 2006, which stated: 
“The Lebanese government is blatantly violating the resolution of the U.N. Security 
Council which calls, among other things, for the removal of the Hizbullah terrorist 
f two workers.  Id.  The port of Tripoli was attacked, and the 
odern lighthouse and a maritime 
organization from the Lebanese border, and is therefore fully responsible for the current 
situation.”  Id. 
 242. Israel struck the port of Beirut, which included fuel tanks that exploded and 
resulted in the deaths o  
Israeli air force also launched strikes on Beirut’s m
antenna in Tripoli.  Id. 
 243. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 456. 
 244. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 5. 
 245. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 457.  The doctrine of distinction is closely tied to 
the principles of proportionality and military necessity.  The doctrine of distinction 
amage of civilian objects that are not directly connected to military prohibits calculated d
advantage.  Id. at 457 n.174. 
 246. Id. at 458. 
 247. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 defined humanity as prohibiting 
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are separate doctrines, their substantial overlap allows them to be 
analyzed together.  This Part will analyze whether Israel complied with 
the doctrines of humanity and distinction in its method of attack. 
A.  Method of Attack 
Nations must discriminate between combatants who may be attacked 
and noncombatants who cannot be intentionally attacked.248  The 
practicalities of warfare provide that locations that are populated with 
civilians are often still considered legitimate military objectives.249  As 
Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states, “The presence . . . of 
the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render 
certain points or areas immune from military operations . . . .”250  Simply, 
civilians do not enjoy absolute immunity.  The nature of war makes it 
nearly impossible to strike military targets without injuring noncombatants.  
Because collateral damage that is disproportionate to the military advantage 
gained is prohibited, nations must rely on the principles of distinction 
and discrimination to limit civilian casualties.251  Commanders must use 
care in choosing the method of destruction and pay particular attention 
to the controllability of weapons in conducting aerial strikes.252 
Indiscriminate attacks include those not aimed at a specific military 
target, those using weapons that cannot be aimed solely at the military 
target, and those using weapons the effects of which cannot be confined 
to the military target.  Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by Paragraph 
4 of Article 51 of the Protocol;253 thus, commanders may not target a 
legitimate military object when the means of the attack will affect both 
 
methods of combat that “uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render 
their death inevitable.”  St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, 
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 1 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
SUPP. 95 (1907).  Article 23 of the Fourth Hague Convention prohibits “employ[ing] 
arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”  Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 87, art. 23(e). 
 248. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 457–58.  Thus, nations must distinguish legitimate 
military targets from nonmilitary targets.  Id. 
 249. See Reynolds, supra note 45, at 81–82. 
 250. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Thus, the jus in bello requires that planners of an attack choose a method of 
attack which minimizes destruction to civilians by paying particular attention to the 
controllability of their weapons, particularly in aerial strikes.  Brown, supra note 103, at 
142–43. 
 253. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 51. 




combatants and civilians without distinction.254  In addition, Article 57 
imposes a duty on attackers to “take all feasible precautions in the choice 
of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any 
event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects.”255  The means and method of a combat 
strike are as important as the possibility of collateral damage from the 
execution of the attack.256  A weapon’s controllability is dictated by its 
ability to confine damage to a particular military object and avoid 
civilian damage.257  The immediate physical damage to the military 
objects as well as the long-term environmental impact must be examined 
when analyzing this factor.258  It is important to consider that no weapon 
is capable of total accuracy; factors including target intelligence, 
planning time, weather changes, crew experience, pilot error, and 
weapons malfunction rates must be considered when determining a 
weapon’s accuracy.259 
Additionally, commanders must use weapons and perform strikes that 
are not likely to cause unnecessary suffering.260  There is debate, 
however, as to whether nations must use weapons with the greatest 
accuracy rate or the least risk of causing collateral damage.261  Some 
scholars believe the doctrine of humanity requires that only precision-
guided missiles be used when given a choice.262  As only a few nations, 
namely Israel,263 Britain, Russia, and the United States, have such 
 254. If an armed attack can be undertaken within these limitations, it is legitimate; 
otherwise the strike is prohibited.  Canestaro, supra note 74, at 458.  The availability of 
precision-guided munitions does not by any means restrict alternative methods of attack.  
Yoram Dinstein, Collateral Damage and the Principle of Proportionality, in NEW WARS, 
NEW LAWS?: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICTS 221 
(David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).  It must also be considered that, 
should forces actually employ precision-guided munitions, they will be susceptible to 
stricter scrutiny when additional options in targeting inevitably arise.  Id. at 221–22. 
 255. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 57. 
 256. Discrimination is linked to the intentions of the attacker, and the “distinction is 
not determined by the amount of the devastation or the number of deaths, but by the 
direction of the action itself, i.e., by what is deliberately intended and directly done.”   
Parks, supra note 74, at 5. 
 257. Brown, supra note 103, at 142. 
 258. Id. at 143.  For example, military planners must assess the later environmental 
damage caused by crop destruction or defoliation before pursuing a military strike.  Id. 
 259. Hampson, supra note 168, at 48. 
 260. Herthel, supra note 75, at 249.  Typically, this concerns the ability to aim and 
control the weapon in question.  Id.  For example, a long-range missile with little 
guidance abilities may be objectionable if used in a populated city because it is too 
indiscriminate.  Schmitt, supra note 171, at 147.  Biological weapons that spread 
contagious diseases would more clearly fall under this category, because these weapons 
cannot limit the effect to only combatants and they are quite difficult to control.  Id. 
 261. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 465. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Moshe Yaalon, The Rules of War, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2006, at A27. 
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capabilities, it seems illogical that they should be held to a higher standard 
of law.264 
1.  Cluster Bombs 
Whether cluster bombs are a controllable means of attack has been a 
frequent question for international law.265  There are currently no 
express prohibitions against cluster bombs; in fact, cluster bombs have 
been used in at least fourteen armed conflicts to date.266  Cluster 
munitions are designed as “area” weapons for destroying light armor and 
personnel over a given area.267  The munitions are grouped into several 
clusters of smaller bomblets that are designed to explode at or near 
impact.268  When a number of cluster bombs are deployed at once, they 
are capable of covering an area equivalent to nineteen football fields.269  
Humanitarian groups have widely condemned the use of these munitions 
on two bases, namely, that cluster bombs are indiscriminate because they 
(1) cannot be selectively and accurately deployed; and (2) the bomblets 
which do not detonate create minefields that cannot distinguish between 
combatants and noncom 270batants.  
The first criticism of humanitarian groups is that cluster bombs are 
indiscriminate by nature because the weapons cover a large area and the 
dispersion of bomblets is unsystematic.271  The Commentaries for the 
Protocol have outlined specific examples of indiscriminate means, or 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. See generally Michael Krepon, Weapons Potentially Inhumane: The Case of 
Cluster Bombs, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 595, 595–605 (1974) (noting the devastating effects of 
cluster bombs in the Vietnam War). 
 266. Herthel, supra note 75, at 238.  A spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces 
correctly stated, “All the weapons and munitions used by the IDF are legal under 
international law and their use conforms with international standards.”  Anthony Shadid, 
In Lebanon, a War’s Lethal Harvest, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2006, at A1.  However, the 
Reagan administration ceased providing these weapons to Israel after a congressional 
investigation found that Israel had used the cluster bombs inappropriately in the 1982 
campaign in Lebanon.  Id. 
 267. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of 
International Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 96 (2002). 
 268. Herthel, supra note 75, at 234–35. 
 269. McDonnell, supra note 267, at 96. 
 270. Herthel, supra note 75, at 249.  A Committee of the ICTY explained that the 
use of cluster bombs was not prohibited by any specific treaty provision and that the 
tribunal must only examine whether the cluster bombs were employed in accordance 
with general principles regulating weapons.  ICTY Report, supra note 218, at 1264. 
 271. Herthel, supra note 75, at 262–63. 
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“methods which by their very nature have an indiscriminate character, 
such as poisoning wells.”272  In fact, even landmines, which are intentionally 
programmed to remain dormant until blindly activated, are not currently 
considered indiscriminate by nature.273  Further, the mere fact that a 
weapon can be used to cover a large battlefield area is not alone a 
determinative factor in considering if the weapon is indiscriminate.274  
Assuming planners considered alternatives, such as limiting the area of 
detonation by dropping the munitions at various altitudes and with 
various spin rates, this method of attack should withstand the first 
criticism of being indiscriminate by nature.275 
Second, cluster bombs have been criticized because they do not 
always ignite as designed and thus produce minefields which are unable 
to distinguish between civilians and combatants.276  Ordnance that fails 
to explode and weapons malfunctions are a reality in modern warfare.  It 
is estimated that five to seven percent of cluster bombs are duds.277  
However, this unexploded ordnance is not designed to function like a 
mine; that is, it is not constructed to explode from movement in its 
proximity, such as when someone walks by.278  Instead, the dud munitions 
are akin to any other unexploded bomb, they just differ in size.279  If 
landmines, which are specifically designed to lie in wait before 
detonating, are not considered indiscriminate, then cluster bombs should 
not be considered so simply because they have the potential to 
malfunction. 
2.  Human Shields 
The choice of which weapon or technique to use may be most 
important when enemy combatants choose to use civilians as human 
shields.  Article 51(7) of Protocol expressly forbids the use of civilians 
as human shields, but it does not absolve an attacking commander of 
 
 272. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 107, at 623. 
 273. Herthel, supra note 75, at 265. 
 274. Id. at 264. 
 275. Id. at 268.  The important distinction between cluster bombs and indiscriminate 
weapons is the ability to aim and successfully discriminate between civilian and military 
objectives.  McDonnell, supra note 267, at 79.  Indiscriminate weapons that are truly 
“blind” include the free-flying balloons that carried incendiary bombs that the Japanese 
used in World War II.  Id. 
 276. Herthel, supra note 75, at 249. 
 277. Id. at 266. 
 278. Major General Chuck Wald, Department of Defense News Briefing (May 13, 
1999), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=541. 
 279. Id.  As with other unexploded ordinance, it is not clear what will cause dud 
cluster munitions to detonate; any vibration could cause it to explode.  McDonnell, supra 
note 267, at 42. 
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liability if a defender uses humans as shields.280  If intelligence reveals 
that combatants are attempting to shield legitimate targets with human 
shields, commanders are still responsible for exercising care.281  The 
attacking commander must still take the enumerated precautionary 
measures outlined in the Protocol to avoid unnecessary civilian 
casualties.282  Article 57 states that the military commander must still 
“take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects.”283  Additionally, Article 57 requires attackers to verify the 
objectives to be attacked, take all feasible precautions to minimize 
civilian damage, and refrain from indiscriminate attacks and from a 
strike entirely if it would result in excessive collateral damage.284  These 
provisions calling for the attacker but not the defender to assume 
additional safety measures to limit civilian casualties have been heavily 
criticized.285 
International customary law requires the attacker and defender to 
share the responsibility of protecting civilians.286  Attackers are under 
the customary duty to protect civilians from harm by exercising ordinary 
 
 280. Protocol I, supra note 13. 
    The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians 
shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks 
or to shield, favour or impede military operations.  The Parties to the conflict 
shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians 
in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield 
military operations. 
Id. art. 51; see also Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and 
Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 
16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 445, 455 (2002). 
 281. Hampson, supra note 168, at 48. 
 282. Herthel, supra note 75, at 261–62. 
 283. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 57. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 459–60.  The United States and Israel have taken 
the position that both the attacker launching attacks on military targets and the opponent 
subject to the attack have an equal responsibility to protect civilians from indiscriminate 
attacks.  The legal standard applied in Protocol I which confers main responsibility upon 
the attacker as understood in jus in bello, whether in attack, defense, or even in violation 
of the jus ad bellum prohibitions on the use of force, does not reflect customary 
international law.  See Marco Sassòli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of 
“Military Objectives” for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 
in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?, supra note 254, at 181, 207. 
 286. Parks, supra note 74, at 201–02. 
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care in undertaking strikes.287  Defenders are under the customary duty 
to separate military objectives and control the civilian population to 
minimize injury.288  The defender has complete access to the civilian 
population, thus when defenders place military targets within the civilian 
population they are consciously putting a civilian population at risk.289  
It is illogical to conclude that the defender’s deliberate efforts that cause 
a military strike to be less discriminate should increase the duty of care 
on the attacker.290  As Parks has argued, these provisions “clearly were 
intended to raise the standard of care for the attacker while lowering it 
for the defender, thereby shifting the burden for minimization of collateral 
civilian casualties to the party to the conflict with the least control over 
the civilian population.”291  Thus, when civilian losses result from a 
defender’s attempts to use civilians to shield military objectives, ultimate 
responsibility should lie with those putting civilians at risk.292  As Israel’s 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Dan Gillerman, told an emergency 
session of the Security Council: “These women and children killed . . . 
may have been killed by Israeli fire, but they are the victims of 
Hezbollah, they are the victims of terrorism.”293  This is not to say that 
the attacker should be absolved from responsibility to avoid or at least 
minimize injury to civilians, but Israel should not be required to assume 
additional duties as a result of “an intervening cause for which the 
attacker is not responsible.”294  When analyzing Israel’s actions in light 
of Hezbollah’s use of human shields, it is important to assess the strikes 
both under international customary law and the Protocol’s aspirational 
provisions which increased the burden of care on the attacker. 
 
 287. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 460. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Parks, supra note 74, at 52. 
 291. Id. at 201–02.  There is an inherent uncertainty in war, and even the best 
attempts to use aerial strikes to hit precise targets can be easily thwarted.  Id. at 201.  
Attackers have mistakenly hit their own targets and even properly marked civilian targets 
in “friendly fire” incidents.  Likewise, defenders have thwarted strikes on their own 
military targets by entangling civilians with military objectives.  Given the confusion of 
war, the customary rules of war place the burden on both attacker and defender to 
distinguish populations and minimize collateral damage.  Id. at 201–02. 
 292. Id. at 201–02. 
 293. Israel has laid the blame on Hezbollah because it has continually fired rockets 
from Lebanese towns and repeatedly used civilians as shields, both of which are clear 
violations of international law.  Liz Sly & Joel Greenberg, Israel Suspends Air Raids, 
CHI. TRIB., July 31, 2006, at A1.  Israel released a video of Hezbollah firing rockets from 
the apartment building in Qana, which was later hit by an Israeli strike.  The attack killed 
fifty refugees sheltered in the basement.  Id. 
 294. Parks, supra note 74, at 29. 
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B.  Analysis 
Israel has repeatedly been criticized for attacks considered to be 
uncontrollable.  In an August 2006 report, Amnesty International accused 
Israel’s aerial strikes of being indiscriminate and causing civilian deaths 
in violation of international law.295 
U.N. officials have estimated that 590 Lebanese sites were blanketed 
with cluster munitions, mainly fired in the days leading up to the 
ceasefire.296  Israel presumably chose to drop cluster munitions because 
they were an effective means to destroy the varied Hezbollah rocket 
positions, which were sending an average of 100 rockets a day into 
Israel.297  There is no weapon, no matter how technologically advanced, 
that can instantly identify and distinguish five terrorists or even 
disguised rocket launchers within a crowded village.  Though Israel had 
the means to use precision-guided missiles298 or other high-tech 
countermeasures, they were under no affirmative duty to do so.299  
Further, the use of high-tech weapons is often defended by effectively 
using low-tech countermeasures such as guerilla warfare or disguising 
combatants and military objects as purely civilian.300  While higher 
collateral damage may result from the use of cluster munitions, it is 
hardly the fault of the attacker that the combatants chose to hide in cities 
for cover.  In fact, it is the defender that is in violation for causing 
unnecessary suffering by commingling combatant and noncombatant 
 
 295. Sullivan, supra note 4.  Amnesty International’s report claimed that Israel had 
purposely targeted “civilians and destroy[ed] Lebanese infrastructure as part of a 
deliberate military strategy that violated international law.”  Id.  Amnesty’s Secretary 
General, Irene Khan, stated, “Civilians must not be made to pay the price for unlawful 
conduct on either side.”  Id.  The group has pleaded that “[j]ustice is urgently needed if 
respect for the rules of war is ever to be taken seriously.”  Id. 
 296. Shadid, supra note 266. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Yaalon, supra note 263. 
 299. Canestaro, supra note 74, at 465. 
 300. Id. at 480.  Guerrilla warfare is an unconventional technique of warfare in 
which one side uses hit-and-run tactics without regard for the accepted rules of war.  See 
IAN O. LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM 94–96 (1999).  Though the 
method is often credited to Mao Zedong, the practice can be traced to biblical times.  
Phillip Michael Romero, An Immunological Approach to Counter-Terrorism and 
Infrastructure Defense Law in Electronic Domains, 14 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 101, 110 
(2006).  The name was derived from a famous Spaniard, Gonzalo Guerrero, who 
defected and fought with the Mayans against the conquistadors.  Id. 
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facilities.301  Therefore, Hezbollah seems to be guilty of abuses of both 
discrimination and humanity. 
The last main argument often levied at Israel is that it should have 
suspended attacks on these legitimate objects when it became apparent 
that the attack would “be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”302  This argument has been cited in 
connection with an Israeli strike on a two-story complex which housed 
the Hamas militant leader and bombmaker Mohammed Deif.303  Deif 
and other leaders of Hamas believed to be responsible for the abduction 
of an Israeli soldier were hiding in a residential home in a crowded Gaza 
City neighborhood.304  Upon receiving intelligence, Israel sent an F-16 
warplane to drop a 550-pound bomb on the house at 2:30 a.m. local time, 
despite the fact that the terrorist leaders were hiding among civilians.305  
The bomb killed nine members of the resident family, though the target 
Deif was only injured.306  Hospital officials said thirty-seven people were 
wounded from the bombardment.307  An official in the office of Israeli 
Prime Minister explained that “Israel is compelled to take action against 
those planning to unleash lethal terror attacks against Israeli citizens, 
[even if] Palestinian terrorist leaders continue to take refuge among and 
hide behind their own civilians.”308 
Under the principle of distinction, a commander is required to employ 
the method or means of attack likely to cause the least civilian injury 
relative to the military advantage gained.309  A terrorist leader is an 
appropriate military target, and under Protocol I, large-scale collateral 
 
 301. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 58. 
 302. Id. art. 57.  AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 5. 
 303. See News Release, Amnesty Int’l, Israel/Occupied Territories: Civilian 
Population at Risk in Gaza (July 14, 2006), http://www.amnesty.ca/resource_centre 
/news/view.php?load=arcview&article=3599&c=Resource+Centre+News.  Deif had appeared 
at the top of Israel’s most wanted list since 1992, and was the leader of the Izzedin al-
Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing.  Thomas Wagner & Sarah El Deeb, Top Hamas 
Leader Hurt in Israeli Bombing, BREITBART.COM, July 12, 2006, http://www.breitbart.com/ 
article.php?id=D8IQNIJ01&show_article1. 
 304. Wagner & El Deeb, supra note 303.  Israel claimed that the targeted home was 
a key Hamas hideout, however a spokesman for Hamas’s military wing disputed the 
claim.  Id. 
 305. Gaza Neighbours “Felt Earthquake,” BBC NEWS, July 12, 2006, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5173410.stm. 
 306. Deaths Mount in Attacks on Gaza, BBC NEWS, July 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/5171148.stm. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Wagner & El Deeb, supra note 303. 
 309. Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of 
Modern War, 39 INT’L LAW. 733, 733–34 (2005). 
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damage may be acceptable when a proper military objective is targeted.310  
Civilian casualties are a likely consequence from an attack by aircraft 
carrying unguided bombs, but as long as the expected damage is 
outweighed by the military advantage gained, Israel has acted within 
the guidelines of the Protocol.311  The unguided bomb used in the Deif 
strike seems to have hit a legitimate military target without excessive 
collateral damage in relation to military goals.  As mentioned previously, 
Israel is under no duty to use guided munitions,312 but given this target it 
seems that the method of bombing, guided or dumb, made little difference.  
In fact, using a guided missile would have likely had the same result of 
hitting the house that collapsed while causing some collateral damage.  
Though precision-guided munitions have an estimated accuracy rate of 
ninety percent while dumb bombs only have one of thirty percent, the 
strike employed by Israel was effective and the means do not seem 
extreme relative to the anticipated military gain.313  Israel’s dumb bomb 
fulfilled the requirement of planners to “take all feasible precautions in 
the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and 
in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects.”314 
While Israel has been criticized for using bombs that damaged an 
estimated 15,000 homes,315 according to the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), it took great safety 
measures to minimize loss of civilian life.  The Israeli army dropped 
 
 310. Id. at 747. 
 311. The Israeli military is in the unique position of being one of the few modern 
militaries to commit to large-scale urban warfare.  Christopher B. Puckett, Comment, In 
This Era of “Smart Weapons,” Is a State Under an International Legal Obligation to 
Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 645, 718 
(2004).  In fact, in conducting campaigns through the narrow streets and dense apartment 
complexes, the military has found that modern precision bombing from F-15s and F-16s 
using 500- to 1000-pound bombs has been unsuccessful in preventing collateral damage.  
Id. 
 312. See Canestaro, supra note 74, at 465 (noting that it is illogical for states which 
possess precision weaponry to be held to a higher standard than states who do not). 
 313. Belt, supra note 107, at 131. 
 314. See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 57. 
 315. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 7.  OCHA was created in December 1991 
under Resolution 46/182, in order to “strengthen the United Nation’s response to both 
complex emergencies and natural disasters . . . [and] improv[e] the overall effectiveness 
of the UN’s humanitarian operations in the field.”  OCHAonline.un.org, A Brief History 
of OCHA, http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/tabid/1076/Default.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2008). 





leaflets to warn of impending military strikes and urged the civilian 
population of southern Lebanon to flee the area and to avoid contact 
with Hezbollah.316  While Israel used unguided bombs and cluster 
bombs to destroy infrastructure, the means and method of attack appear 
reasonable given the precautionary measures to minimize collateral 
damage.  These munitions fit within the definition of distinction, and 
Israel’s efforts also show an attempt to p
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Israel’s aerial campaigns in response to Hezbollah were conducted 
under the international customary laws of war.  Despite the aspirational 
view of international law promoted by Amnesty International and even 
the ICRC, accepted international practice does not prohibit Israel’s 
actions.  No military operation is perfect, and it is regrettable that civilians 
will die as a result of aerial bombing.  However, Israel has conducted 
this campaign properly, without unnecessary suffering or indiscriminate 
attacks.  Further, it seems that Israel’s targeting of military objects was 
lawful and exercised in good faith.  Finally, the attacks on Hezbollah, 
though widespread, were proportionate to the goals of Israel’s military 
operation, preventing future Hezbollah attacks against Israel. 
Striking a balance between responding to terrorists and respecting 
international custom and humanitarian law is difficult considering the 
ambiguities and uncertain applications in this unconventional method of 
combat.  Israel’s struggle against terrorism has highlighted some important 
gaps in the existing legal framework, particularly the doctrines of 
proportionality, necessity, distinction, and humanity.  Although these 
concepts as defined in Protocol I may not be precise, their historical and 
customary applications provide the more preferable definitions.  It is 
customary international law that is likely to be accepted by most nations 
when confronting terrorists in the future. 
 
 316. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 6, at 18 (citing Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
IDF Warns Lebanese Civilians to Leave Danger Zones, July 25, 2006, http://www.mfa.gov 
.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/IDF+warns 
+Lebanese+civilians+to+leave+danger+zones+3-Aug-2006.htm). 
